

ADM 223-475 PW Interrogation 1939-45

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A. INTRODUCTION

This paper is designed to set out the lessons learnt ~~during the war of 1939-45~~ on the interrogation of German Naval prisoners of war {between 1939 and 1945, when our experience was great and our success often considerable}. It does not ~~set out~~ {aim} to be a history of the section concerned or of its activities, which are on record in the C.B. 04051 series and in bound files in the possession of N.I.D.1. Of necessity, however, it is historical in the sense that it sets out the developments which occurred throughout the war in the light of changing circumstances. These developments themselves illustrate the lessons which were learnt. It is hoped that it will be possible for those who wish to make use of these lessons in a future war to be able to see not only the optimum to be aimed at but also what is to be aimed at or is attainable during a specific period.

~~This paper does not cover~~ The interrogation of civilians, refugees, neutrals, spies or agents, all of whom were interrogated by organisations outside the Admiralty, is not covered here}. Merchant seamen, however, were interrogated by the Admiralty and classed as prisoners of war.

{The abbreviation "p/w" (plural "ps/w"), which came to be universally accepted in this war, is used throughout to mean "prisoner-of-war." "C.S.D.I.C." means "Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre" and is described in Section B. The word "interrogation" is used to describe the whole process of obtaining intelligence from ps/w, and not merely the direct questioning of ps/w, which is known as "direct interrogation."

While the relation of the p/w interrogation section to N.I.D., the Admiralty and the other authorities is discussed below, the relationship of p/w intelligence to other sources and the way in which it was made to fit into the jigsaw puzzle as a whole are not covered because they are quite properly not the concern of the p/w section... }

B. THE GENERAL ORGANISATION FOR PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION IN U.K.

a) The Lessons of the War of 1914-18

During the war of 1914-18 interrogation developed from nothing to the point from which we started in 1939. The main lessons which ~~it taught~~ {were then learnt} were that haphazard interrogation through ~~the~~ interpreters not trained in intelligence was well-nigh useless; that interrogators, therefore, have to be both German speakers and experts in intelligence; that the ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} must be brought to the interrogators and the interrogators not made to travel to the port of arrival of the prisoners; that facilities must be available for segregation of prisoners. The following statement {which} was drawn up in 1939, ~~and should be borne in mind as a pointer to the most devious (?) lessons to be borne in mind~~ {summarises the principles behind all p/w interrogation:-}

"At the beginning of the late war (1914-18) interrogation was carried out in a rather haphazard manner at the ports where the prisoners landed. The interrogator was not necessarily a German interpreter. Reliance was placed on one or other of the ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} speaking English and although this method assured that prisoners were questioned before they had recovered from shock, it had certain very definite disadvantages, which may be summarised as follows:-

- a) The untrained interrogator usually puts ideas into people's heads.
- b) He asks leading questions and unwittingly gets the answers he wants.
- c) He is unable to benefit by the knowledge of other interrogations and, therefore, does not necessarily know which questions to ask.
- d) Arrangements for segregation are bound to be inadequate and having once talked matters over between themselves, ~~prisoners of war~~ {ps/w} are unlikely to yield any further information that would be of value.
- e) Furthermore, having once been questioned, they are very chary of any further interrogation. They would be on their guard and the trained interrogator would not have a chance.
- f) There are bound to be mutual misunderstandings between prisoners of war and interrogators who cannot speak German and who do not understand German manners and modes of thought. These misunderstandings may lead to entirely false deductions being drawn".

b) The Responsibility of the War Office and the Inter-Service Organisation (C.S.D.I.C.)

It must be assumed that in future, as in past, wars the War Office will be responsible for the custody, movement and handling of enemy prisoners of war, and that the central organisation for their interrogation must logically {therefore} also be under War Office control.

In the war of 1939-45 this central organisation took the form of the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (C.S.D.I.C.).

The following brief statement, which was drawn up by the War Office in 1945 shortly before the surrender of Germany, gives a concise account of the development of the C. S.D.I.C.:

1. The Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre was planned by the three fighting services before the war. Its duties were defined as follows:-
 - a) The long-term examination of selected ps/w of all three Services, captured or landed in U.K.
 - b) The development and utilisation of such technical aids to examination (listening apparatus, stool-pigeons etc.) as could be devised.
2. Since it had been agreed that the Army should be responsible, in the person of the Adjutant General, for the physical administration of ps/w of all Services, it was decided that the Army must also co-ordinate the inter-service intelligence requirements and it was made responsible for the organisation, maintenance and development of the Centre.
3. C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) is under the direct joint control of the Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I.) and the Director of Prisoners of War (D.P.W.) War Office, but as its objective is solely the acquisition of Intelligence, all questions which arise are taken up through D.M.I. (M.I.19) who secure D.P.W's approval on all aspects of the administrative side.
4. The unit started to function on 2nd September 1939 at the Tower of London with three Army officers, one Naval officer and two R.A.F. officers. In December 1939 C.S.D.I.C. moved to Cockfosters, Barnet, and an establishment showing a total of 515 Army personnel was subsequently promulgated. Three years later the V.C.I.G.S., after consultation with ~~Director of Naval Intelligence~~ {D.N.I.} and A.C.A.S.(I), decided that the value of {the} intelligence which C.S.D.I.C. had been providing rendered expansion essential.

Early in 1943 the numbers of the War Establishment were increased to a total of 994 military personnel (including A.T.S.). This establishment was designed to provide adequate staff for the following three Centres in which C.S.D.I.C. now operates:-

- a) No. 1 Distribution Centre ~~Situated~~ at Latimer, Bucks and houses the H.Q.
- b) No. 2 Distribution Centre ~~Situated~~ at Beaconsfield, Bucks, approximately eight miles from the H.Q.
- c) No. 11 Camp ~~Situated~~ at Cockfosters, Barnet where German Senior Officer ps/w are held.

At these three locations the Army provides and operates, for the benefit of all Services, all the ancillary means of obtaining intelligence, as indicated in para 1(b) above, which means have progressively been developed and extended until they have become one of C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)'s major commitments.

5. ~~From the man power point of view~~ C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) may therefore be considered to fall into the following {four} main Divisions

- a) The overall organisation of both ancillary means and physical administration, which the Army supplies to the Service Direct Interrogation Components.
- b) Naval Interrogation Component.
- c) Army Interrogation Component.
- d) Air Interrogation Component."

It is to be assumed that in a future war the War Office will have, and make available, the full record of the organisation outlined above.

~~In addition to the C.S.D.I.C. which was controlled by D.M.I., the War Office~~ {The activities of D.P.W., who} was responsible for the administration of enemy prisoners of war and {ps/w of} all services, ~~through the D.P.W. his activities~~ included the administration [sic] of all Prisoner of War {p/w} camps in England {U.K.}, their reception {of p/w} in cages before they were distributed to the C.S.D.I.C. or base camps and their movement by rail, road or aircraft {in U.K.}

No. 1 Distribution Centre at Latimer and No. 2 Distribution Centre at Beaconsfield, which were specially constructed in 1942 as a result of the lessons learned in the previous years, were designed to accommodate a maximum of 64 prisoners, each in fully equipped cells, and to provide holding room for approximately 30 prisoners each in addition.

c) The Naval Component

The naval aspect of C.S.D.I.C. is fully discussed below {in the body of this paper}. In its essentials it consisted of a staff of approximately 10 R.N.V.R. and W.R.N.S. officers and the necessary typists at the C.S.D.I.C., with a controlling section in N.I.D. Admiralty.

d) Relations of the Naval Section with the Army

{Allowing for} minor divergences of opinion {such as are unavoidable between different services} ~~unavoidable. It can nevertheless emphatically be stated that throughout the war our relations with the War Office were of the best. The War Office was always ready to fall in with the desires and wishes of the Admiralty and often went to great pains to carry them out. It was sometimes necessary to bring pressure to bear upon the Army~~ {Although more authority had sometimes to be shown than might have been thought necessary} and, on one occasion at least, the V.C.N.S. had to be requested to use his influence with the V.C.I.G.S. to ensure that C.S.D.I.C. was adequately equipped to handle {growing numbers of} naval prisoners {ps/w} at the right moment{, the War Office may fairly be said to have carried out its responsibilities ungrudgingly and with the greatest possible promptitude}. In considering the development of the C.S.D.I.C. through the war, it should be ~~noted~~ {remembered} that until 1944, when large numbers of Army prisoners {ps/w} were captured in France, the C.S.D.I.C. existed almost solely to cater for the requirements of the Admiralty and Air Ministry, since, with the exception of a few German Army prisoners {ps/w} who were brought to England {U.K.} from North Africa, all the Germans who passed through the Centres were either naval or air force {ps/w}. It might be assumed that the whole organisation, having been placed in the sole control of the War Office, difficulties and jealousies were bound to occur; it is nevertheless true that such difficulties and jealousies ~~which~~ {as} did occur were ~~of a very minor nature~~ {unimportant} and did not affect the work as a whole.

C. INTERROGATION METHODS

a) General

As shown in B(b) above, overall responsibility for interrogation rested with the War Office and the C.S.D.I.C. which they administered was specifically designed to provide all the necessary aids to interrogation. The Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War was always scrupulously observed, especially since enemy prisoners {ps/w} had access to the Protecting Power and any deviation from the Convention would eventually be reported to the enemy who would have taken {a} reciprocal attitude towards British prisoners {ps/w} in his hands. There was, therefore, no question of ~~3rd~~ {third} degree methods being used even had they been necessary.

b) Aids to Interrogation

Various aids to interrogation are generally well-known by the public although their application is not a matter of common knowledge. They consist chiefly of the use of microphones to overhear prisoners' conversations and of the use of stool-pigeons (hereafter referred to as S.P.'s) to gain the prisoners' confidence and extract ~~unwitting~~ information from them. These and ancillary aids are dealt with in paragraphs c) to e) below. {While the other services also used these aids, the naval section concentrated much effort on the selection and training of S.P.s, used many more (?) than the other services and was therefore (?) able to (???) much (???) amount of valuable information with a staff of British officers that was comparatively much smaller than that used by the other two services.}

c) Use of Microphones

When the C.S.D.I.C. was set up at Cockfosters, many of the rooms used as cells were specially wired; as a result of the experience gained there the centres which were subsequently built at Latimer and Beaconsfield were specifically designed to incorporate a system of microphones in all the cells. The "M" Room, from which all the listening and transcribing was done, may possibly be described as the nerve centre of the ~~whole organisation~~ {C.S.D.I.C.} A very large staff would have been required to cover all the cells simultaneously and the training of the operators is a lengthy business. The maximum number of operators{, all of whom were selected, trained and administered by the Army,} ever available {to all three services} was about 150; they had to work in watches, take leave and were sometimes sick and in consequence the naval section could never rely on more than about 8 cells being covered at the same time.

These operators were at first recruited from German-speaking Englishmen; it was later found possible to use refugee Germans. They naturally had continually to be kept informed of the subjects of interest and themselves {often} became experts in the intelligence concerned.

The normal practice was for one man to ~~be listening~~ to one room; it was sometimes ~~even~~ possible ~~for him~~ to cover more than one {at the same time} particularly when conversation was flagging or prisoners {ps/w} were sleeping or eating. Whenever a subject cropped up which the operator knew or thought to be of interest he would either make notes or, the more usual procedure, switch on the recording apparatus; ~~this~~ {the record or records} would thereafter be transcribed, {-} a laborious business, since even when the language spoken is English it is often very difficult to follow a conversation exactly, {-} and eventually typed out, first in German and later in English translation.

The original type-written transcript was always submitted first to the Service directly concerned, which would mark the passages which required publication; it was then translated and issued in the form of an "S.R", usually in large numbers to each {Service} Ministry, ~~who~~ {which} saw to ~~their~~ {its} own {internal} distribution. This process became a fine art in the course of the war and the number of S.R's issued, often consisting of several pages, ran into many thousands. They were of the greatest assistance to staff departments, and, particularly in the case of the very full transcripts of the conversation of captured German ~~agents~~ {generals}, provided interesting reading for the Board of Admiralty and other senior officers; it was said that Field-Marshal Alexander and Montgomery always complained if their copies did not arrive in time since these S.R's enabled the Field-Marshal to make very accurate assessments of the enemy's frame of mind. Bound copies of all the S.R's issued during the war are available in the records of ~~the Admiralty~~ {N.I.D.}

S.R's were divided into S.R.N. (Navy), S.R.M. (Army), S.R.A. (Royal Air Force), S.R.G.G. (German generals) etc. They were always classified as Top Secret and remain so, not so much because of their inherent secrecy, a secret which was well known to a very large number of people, but rather because although the Germans were perfectly aware that we used microphones, they had no conception of the fine art to which this process had been brought and themselves never obtained intelligence of the same order in this way.

The application of the use of microphones often varied with the different services,- the Air Force interrogators used the system much more to check on the veracity of statements made by prisoners in direct interrogation than to obtain new intelligence; we, on the other hand, while using it for the same purpose as the Air Force, also organised ~~the matter~~ {our interrogation} in such a way that the intelligence which was obtained by S.R. was great enough in itself to save us much work and often produced information which we would never otherwise have known. This ~~ws~~ [sic] largely made possible by the close cooperation and interest of the operators and by skilful preparation and mixing of prisoners from whom we desired to obtain intelligence.

d) **Stool Pigeons**

Early in the war a few refugee Germans were recruited to act as stool-pigeons. It naturally required some time before they could pick up sufficient background to pose as ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} and it was generally speaking found preferable to mix those wearing German Air Force uniform with German naval ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} and vice versa.

These ~~prisoners~~ {refugees} did exceedingly valuable work and the best of them remained far and away the most brilliant S.P's {of all} until the end of the war.

Even when serving in the Armed Forces Germans in this war could be divided into Nazis and non-Nazis, a fact which it was very difficult for those who were not in intimate contact with the Germans {fully} to appreciate. It was for this reason that it was eventually possible to obtain the services of bone fide ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} as S.P's.

The first such ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} was a U-boat Petty Officer captured early in 1942, who came from a strong Hamburg socialist background. He worked on our behalf for purely disinterested reasons and ~~probably contributed more~~ {made a very great contribution} to the success of the battle against the U-boats ~~than any other one man concerned with intelligence~~. The number of such bone fide ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} S.P's increased to such an extent later in the war that many German naval ratings

who would have made very good S.P's were not needed. The maximum number of German naval rating S.P's of whom we were making constant use was about 8 eight in 1943/44.

Until early 1944 it was a truism that practically no Intelligence was obtained from officer prisoners {ps/w}; certainly none of them was in the frame of mind to co-operate to the same extent to which the rating S.P's did. Early in 1944, however, the first officer was completely "converted"; his family background was strongly anti-Nazi and he had been serving in one of the destroyers sunk in the Bay of Biscay in December 1943.¹ Thereafter it became progressively easier to convert officers and by the autumn of 1944 we had a permanent staff of some half dozen officers, including two U-boat C.O's, one minesweeping officer, one U-boat Engineer Officer and two midshipmen from the Small Battle Units Command; it would have been possible to increase the number considerably had this been necessary.

It is generally true to state that these S.P's, whether officers or ratings, allowed themselves to be used out of conviction rather than because they received better treatment than [sic] they would otherwise have got in an ordinary Prisoner of War {p/w} base camp. Although it must be admitted that {with one exception} they were not recruited until it was fairly obvious that Germany must lose the war, they knew that they were taking a very considerable risk since there was always the chance of their being recognised or reported home and a very distinct possibility of their getting into very great difficulties when they were repatriated at the end of the war.

Special quarters were obtained for the naval S.P's; the ratings had a cottage in the grounds at Latimer and a special Nissen hut was put up for the officers at Beaconsfield. Although their circumstances were better than those of ordinary prisoners, they had no unusual comforts. A great deal of time had to be spent in looking after them, providing them with books, etc. Apart from this accommodation the only reward they got was to be taken occasionally [sic] to London for the day, S.P's were never promised any particular treatment after the war: they were told that any one who wished to work for us must be intelligent and must therefore realise that whatever the terms of surrender might be, history shows that it is inherent in the British character to govern by co-operation and not by repression; although we would not bind ourselves to any terms, an intelligent German must realise he would best serve {Germany} by throwing in his lot whole-heartedly with Great Britain. It was in fact found possible to take both the officers and the ratings back to Germany in separate batches a few months after the German surrender in such a way that their presence there would arouse the least suspicions.

The normal way {manner} in which S.P's were used was as follows:-

On the arrival of a new batch of prisoners the most important, or at any rate those who seemed likely to have the most information, were selected for "mixing". When something was known of them {their personalities} as a result of preliminary interrogation, individual S.P's were selected for mixing with them, as might seem best. Individual circumstances naturally followed {varied} according to the intelligence which it was desired to obtain. A telegraphist S.P. would normally be put in with a telegraphist prisoner-of-war {p/w} in order to obtain information on radar{, for instance}. It was often useful to mix S.P's who were themselves not U-boat men or were in {some other branch of} the German Armed Forces with prisoners {ps/w} who might be willing to give a full description of their own service to some one outside it. The greatest care had to be taken that a

¹ Presumably an officer from T-25.

prisoner {p/w} was not confronted with an S.P. whom he knew, and arrangements were often made for the S.P. to see the prisoner {p/w} without the latter realising it before he was actually put in the room. The use of S.P.'s reached such proportions that despite all the precautions which were taken, S.P.'s were occasionally "rumbled"; this sometimes necessitated no more than their removal from the room in which they happened to be but at others made it necessary to get rid of them all together. They were then generally sent to a special camp for anti-Nazi prisoners, where their former activities would not be enquired about.

S.P.'s were in theory always listened to by the "M" room in order to make sure that they were not double-crossing us; they were in fact often left to their own devices when they had become well known, and on no occasion did an S.P. ever double-cross any of the services. They would occasionally be brought {called out}, ostensibly for interrogation, and were then able to pass over such information as they had obtained; those with good memories often produced very accurate reports which could be accepted without demur {question}; others became known as having too lively an imagination or too little memory, and it was generally necessary to have these listened to and to obtain their information by S.R. {Very few S.P.'s were ever allowed to know of the S.R. system.}

The S.P.'s were always fully briefed as to the background of any particular case and {as to} the information both general and specific which we needed. For this reason, and because they always kept up to date in their own information on {the} German Armed Forces through continual contact with new prisoners {ps/w} they had a very full knowledge of our own knowledge and interests; none of them has been {was}, however, known to have failed in the trust which was thereby placed in him.

In addition to obtaining information, S.P.'s were frequently used to soften prisoners {ps/w} up and {to} make them more amenable to direct interrogation than they might otherwise have been. S.P.'s sometimes succeeded, generally by concentrating on their political feelings, in persuading individual prisoners to tell us all they knew; the officer S.P.'s were particularly successful in this. A team of 2 two prisoners from the German Army {ps/w} who were violent socialists, was used for this purpose in the U.S. to such an extent {so successfully} that unless they had put the prisoner {a p/w} into a completely co-operative frame of mind within 48 hours it could safely be stated that no-one could obtain information from such prisoners {the particular p/w} by any means at all.

e) Drugs, Psychology, Third Degree, etc.

So far as interrogation at the C.S.D.I.C.'s was concerned, the aids mentioned in paragraphs c) and d) above were the only ones which were found either necessary or useful. Early in the war the use of drugs was carefully investigated and it was found that apart from the difficulty of administering drugs, {them} they did not have the desired effect, experiments were in fact made on {a civilian officer in N.I.D}. Alcohol was used on many occasions to loosen prisoners' tongues but never succeeded in making a prisoner divulge important information which he was anxious to conceal.

Except for {?} statistical purposes the examination by trained psychologists was also found to be useless. By reason of our adherence to the Geneva Convention (see a) above), application of 3rd {third} degree methods was never allowed at C.S.D.I.C. Instances are known where it was successfully used to obtain operational information in the field but in view of the success obtained by other means as mentioned, especially in this section it was {is} doubtful whether any really vital

information{, which would otherwise have been lost,} would ever have been obtained at C.S.D.I.C. by these means.

f) Direct Interrogation

The interrogation of a ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} by a British officer in a proper interrogation room was known as "direct interrogation" and in it no attempt was ever made to conceal its nature, although it was often {to divert} a ~~prisoner's~~ {p/w's} attention ~~to~~ {from} the real purpose ~~of~~ {by} calling him in for a talk. ~~Prisoners~~ {Ps/w} were sometimes also taken for walks in the grounds in order to create a more informal atmosphere or were interrogated outside normal office hours and offered a drink.

The secret of successful direct interrogation was always the ability of the interrogator to assert his personality over that of the ~~prisoner~~ {p/w}; the first necessity was that the interrogator should know very much more than the ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} concerning the German Navy and his own branch of the service, and that ~~he~~ {the p/w} should be given the impression that ~~he~~ {the interrogator} already knew ~~as well~~ full details of the information which he was in fact trying to obtain. It was occasionally unnecessary to give a prisoner more than an idea of the extent of our knowledge and he would then answer all questions readily; generally speaking however, pressure had to be kept up throughout an interrogation. A sub-conscious knowledge of psychology must be part of the armour of any interrogator and he must also be keenly interested in his work ~~apart from the fact that it is his duty~~. The procedure whereby subjects are picked up, dropped and taken up again or lines of approach and thought discovered in the course of conversation on extraneous matters must always be a matter for the individual interrogator to learn by experience and ~~is not capable of being~~ {cannot be} taught to anyone who has not the ability already within him.

The naval interrogators were all commissioned officers and always wore uniform, unless it were considered necessary to put on civilian clothes in order to impress a particular ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} in ~~one way or another~~ {some unusual way}. It must be emphasised that successful interrogation can not be carried out by or through interpreters. All the naval interrogators during this war have {themselves} in one respect or another been experts in Intelligence ~~themselves~~. In addition to the normal intelligence background ~~covering both~~ {of} our ~~own~~ knowledge and our ~~own~~ requirements ~~of the enemy's war effort in all its aspects~~, they had to carry in, their heads an otherwise useless mass of information concerning all possible details of the routine, daily life, amusements, {gossip} etc. of the German Navy; this background was built up both ~~on~~ {from} interrogation ~~reports~~ and from ~~the results of~~ censorship (see L below).

As already mentioned, ~~3rd~~ {third} Degree methods were neither used nor considered necessary. Different interrogators and different services naturally varied in their interrogation methods. It was nevertheless ~~from different~~ {the very definite} experiences of the naval section that in the great majority of cases kindness paid and that physical intimidation would never have succeeded where other methods, including the use of S.P's and S.R., failed at any rate at first. It was found that whereas it was fatal in the case of Germans to relax the discipline which they expected at ~~any rate at first~~ bullying was not the best way to start an interrogation. Provided a ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} was civil and not obviously of evil character, he would generally be offered a seat or a cigarette after the first few questions. The approach to the ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} varied thereafter with the inclinations of the interrogator and his estimate of the ~~prisoner's~~ {p/w's} character and knowledge; some ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} answered all questions immediately, others could be won over by a political approach or by

getting them {interested} in their own particular subject, such as engineering; the latter course could only be taken by an interrogator who was himself a qualified engineer.

When direct approaches, as outlined above, were not at first successful, various alternatives were open to an interrogator. The ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} might be told to go and think the matter over, possibly in {the} expectation that an S.P. would have some affect [sic] on him; ~~they~~ {he} might again {be} threaten{ed} with or given solitary confinement for a few days; threats of various natures, which we in fact neither had {the} desire nor the opportunity to carry out, were often very effective; some ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were willing to believe that they would be shot, sent to Russia or across the Atlantic ~~after~~ {if} they failed to divulge information, their fear of Russia and of having to pass through the U-boat packs, which they believed to be infesting the Atlantic, being such that they often succumbed to such suggestions. A line of approach which was frequently successful was to inform a ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} that unless he could give sufficiently accurate details of his particular job as to convince us that he was in fact what he stated himself to be (e.g. a telegraphist would be expected to know all details of the latest Radar), he would be considered as an agent and therefore liable to summary trial and execution, and would not enjoy the privileges of a ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w}.

Although towards the end of the war there were many genuine anti-Nazis who volunteered all the information they had, it was ~~never~~ {rarely} possible to rely on such political sentiments for the first few years. The Germans impressed many Poles into their services and when taken prisoner they were without exception completely ready to talk; unfortunately, most of them were of a very low mental calibre and few had ever had any work of importance to do. A few German naval deserters whom we picked up during the course of the war were similarly of very little use to Intelligence. Only one case is known of a naval ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} attempting to pass as a rating when he was in fact an officer and he is thought to have been mentally defective.

~~During~~ {In} direct interrogation it was almost invariably the interrogator's practice to take notes during the course of conversation. It was ~~found~~ impossible to remember all points covered unless notes were taken and ~~prisoners'~~ {ps/w's} suspicions were likely to be roused if no notes were taken because they would imagine that the whole conversation was being recorded or listened to by means of microphones. Two officers often interrogated one prisoner at the same time but for reasons of man power amongst others this was far from being a rule. It was only in the case of the most collaborative prisoners that it was found worth while to have a shorthand writer taking notes.

It should perhaps be mentioned that the German authorities took the greatest pains to prevent ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} when interrogated giving more than their name, rank and official number, as required by the Geneva Convention. The efficacy of their efforts varied with the successes of German arms, but ~~apart from~~ {except in} the early phases of the war such security training never succeeded in doing more than making the interrogator's task longer and harder than it might otherwise have been. The lectures which were given in the German navy covered all aspects of interrogation including our use of S.P's and microphones. It was only because the interrogating system was brought to such a fine art that their efforts in this direction were of little value. Where direct interrogation failed and even when ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were so security conscious that they were suspicious of microphones and S.P's, it was generally found that if left quietly to themselves for a few days, and provided no hint was ever given to them that we had already obtained information from them through such means as S.P. or S.R., they generally lost all their distrust of such methods.

Experience showed quite clearly that except in the case of prisoners {ps/w} who were wholly co-operative or for psychological reasons were likely to be impressed, it was a mistake to introduce outside experts into the interrogation rooms and for them to carry out interrogations through an interpreter or, when they knew German, without an interrogator's training. This fact was not always appreciated by the Naval Staff divisions interested in prisoner-of-war {p/w} intelligence, but ~~except in~~ {barring} exceptional cases ~~mentioned above~~ they always eventually obtained more information by briefing interrogators ~~than by insisting on their own presence~~. The success of naval interrogation is dealt with in greater detail below, but it may be stated here that when the success had become established interested divisions and authorities were always ready to leave the method of obtaining intelligence to the experience of the interrogators.

g) Entertainment of Prisoners and Expenses Account

Prisoners {Ps/w} were sometimes taken to London; this was rarely done unless it was thought that the experience would be likely to impress them ~~or~~ {and never} before they had been very thoroughly interrogated and investigated. On one occasion Freiherr v{on} TIESENHAUSEN, the C.O. of the U-boat which had ~~torpedoed~~ {sunk} H.M.S. "BARHAM", was taken to the Admiralty and interviewed by various members of the Naval Staff with considerable success. On the whole, however, such journeys were chiefly useful as part of the process of converting a prisoner {p/w} to a frame of mind in which he would be willing to give all the information in his possession to the interrogators.

{Margin note: The success was Tiesenhausen's. For he ended up interrogating his interlocutors; see ??? p.13. C Mitchell, Apr 47}

Expenses for such trips, for cigarettes, alcohol, etc., used when interrogating and for the supply of a few comforts to the S.P's were borne by D.N.I's secret fund, and in the later stages of the war amounted to an average of about £15 a month.

h) Reconstruction of an Interrogation of a Representative U-boat Crew

The following reconstruction of the interrogation of a representative U-boat ship's company is designed to show the working of the system at its best. A U-boat has been chosen since far more U-boat survivors were interrogated during the war than from any other type of vessel.

~~The~~ {A} signal has been received from a corvette in the Atlantic stating that she has sunk a U-boat and picked up 3 officers and 22 men; {the} officers' names are given and they include the C.O; the corvette, {as the result of hints given by the survivors,} believes the number of the U-boat to have been U 400 ~~as the result of hints given by the survivors~~; the corvette is due to arrive in Liverpool in ~~2~~ {two} days time. Arrangements are immediately made with the Army to provide escorts to meet the survivors and to bring them down to C.S.D.I.C.

The Staff Officer {(Intelligence)} at Liverpool has been asked to obtain names of all the survivors as soon as they land; they are telephoned to Admiralty and then out to C.S.D.I.C., where preliminary arrangements are made to allot the survivors to various cells, there being sufficient accommodation available to hold them all immediately. The ratings are to be sent to Latimer, the officers to Beaconsfield. The C.O. is already well known to us by name and {is} to be in the same cell as ~~the C.O. of~~ a U-boat {C.O.} already under interrogation. ~~The~~ {A} telegraphist, from whom we are anxious to obtain details of the wave-lengths covered by the {latest} Search Receiver, is to be put in with a telegraphist S.P., provided that they do not know each other; U-boats are suspected of having

{a} new type of torpedo whose performance we do not know, and there being two torpedomen among the survivors, one of them is to be put in with an S.P, the other, whom officers in the corvette have stated to be friendly and talkative, is to be mixed with a friendly and intelligent rating lately captured from an E-boat. Pending preliminary interrogation the rest of the survivors are to be accommodated in no particular order.

In addition to the questions which the Naval Staff Divisions responsible ~~for~~ {have} asked us to answer concerning the Search Receiver and the new torpedo, the U-boat tracking room {have} let us know that it is of vital importance to discover at the earliest possible moment what orders the U-boat had, since it is suspected that she and another U-boat still at sea were bound for the Caribbean and the disposition of anti-submarine forces ~~would~~ {will} have to be made accordingly.

The survivors arrive at C.S.D.I.C. at ~~9 o/c at night~~ {2100} and are accommodated as previously arranged without further difficulty. The rooms in which the new prisoners {ps/w} have been mixed with S.P's ~~and other prisoners~~ {or old ps/w} are watched until ~~midnight~~ {2400}. In the morning the first results are obtained from the "M"-room and it appears that the U-boat is indeed U 400, that she has been at sea for 24 days and was bound for the Canadian sea-board, not the Caribbean. The C.O. is exceedingly unpopular and is criticised by the other survivors for having left his ship before taking proper precautions to ensure that everything of value had been destroyed. {This information is very useful for playing on the feelings of the other ps/w during interrogation.}

During the course of this day and the next morning all the survivors are given a preliminary interrogation. It appears that the U-boat was to attempt to attack traffic off Halifax and that she was carrying some new form of torpedo about which no further details are at present obtainable. It is not thought that the telegraphists know anything about a new Search Receiver. There is talk of one having been intended but survivors said that there was not time to mount it before they left Germany. The U-boat was on her first patrol. As a result of these preliminary interrogations it is possible to "dump" ~~10~~ {ten} of the rating survivors as having no further information of value ~~to us~~ to offer. {Those who have been dumped are at the disposal of the other services; they may have information on bombing targets for the RAF or relatives in the German Army the whereabouts of whose units are of interest to the War Office: when the RAF & Army are finished with them they are sent to base camps.} It is then possible to concentrate on the remainder.

The U-boat tracking room has been informed of the orders to proceed to Halifax but wants much greater detail as to the exact ~~spot~~ {position} to which it was intended to go and the tactics to be employed on arrival there. Confirmation is also required as to whether another U-boat was at sea and bound for the same area. The latter point is soon cleared up and it is established that U 300 was due to make for Halifax but that the periscope had been damaged by severe depth-charging off the Faeroes and that she had signalled that she was making for Brest. It is thought unlikely that we shall obtain the other information for a few days since only the C.O. himself is likely to know the exact orders and he is at present not willing to discuss operational matters with his fellow C.O; his room is kept covered {by the M-Room} the whole time.

The interrogator who is the expert on torpedoes concentrates on the more likely of the two torpedomen and by retailing his knowledge of German torpedoes is able to obtain a great deal of information about the new torpedo; the torpedoman is, however, not willing to discuss all its details and ~~first states~~ {after first stating} that he does not know the speed of the torpedo ~~and~~ later {suggests} that it might be 28 knots; he is told that this cannot be ~~the~~ correct speed since ~~its~~ {the}

acoustic mechanism would not operate over 24 knots. He returns to his cell and discusses the interrogation with the S.P. telling him that the interrogator obviously knew far too much and that the speed of the torpedo was in fact 24 knots; the S.P. has been fully briefed on the requirements and questions the prisoner further on the setting mechanism and the length of the run; The prisoner is fully informed on these matters but does not know the tactical use of the torpedo in any detail.

After a few days we know very exactly the history of the U-boat itself, which is uninteresting. A Petty Officer has, however, been discovered who had been serving recently in the engine room of a battleship and {he} is marked down for technical interrogation. A week after the survivors have arrived only the battleship Petty Officer, one torpedomen and one telegraphist are still retained, together with all the officers. In due course the battleship Petty Officer, who is very interested in engineering, is engaged in a long technical discussion ~~in~~ {on} the use of Diesels to propel big ships and very valuable information is obtained on the propulsion of the ship in which he served. During the course of his {these} discussions he is detained for several weeks and is found useful for mixing with new prisoners {ps/w} when they arrive since he is a good talker and has no security consciousness towards microphones. Within a further week it is found possible to "dump" the telegraphist who is known to have no further information. The torpedoman has not produced all the information which it is thought he has and he is kept for mixing with the next torpedoman to be captured in order that they may discuss the subjects on which he has been interrogated which we will then hear by S.R.

The C.O. of the U-boat has been taken out for a drink and for a walk but no attempt has been made to interrogate him directly. After he has been at C.S.D.I.C. for a week he begins to loosen up and is ready to discuss generalities. He is interrogated on the exact orders he had, his personal tactical intentions and on the tactical use of the new torpedo. No direct answers are forthcoming from him, but he returns to his cell and discusses these questions with his fellow C.O. and as a result full details on both questions are obtained by S.R. The Engineer Officer has in the meanwhile shown himself to be knowledgeable on a new automatic depth-keeper, the trials of which he was concerned in. He is interrogated generally by a technical interrogator and during the course of the conversation the subject of automatic depth keepers is brought up and lightly touched on. He is seen two or three times in the course of the week and in the end is completely ready to talk on this and other subjects. He is kept at C.S.D.I.C. in the hopes that he may become a valuable S.P. with a little persuasion. The other officers are meanwhile "dumped" having served their purpose.

During the whole of these {this} series of interrogations full use will have been made of all the different aids. The {Ps/ws'} statements ~~made by prisoners~~, whether in direct interrogation, to S.P's or in S.R., will have been checked and compared and further questions put as a result in order to get the whole story quite clear. By the end of the interrogation an accurate picture has been built up of the U-boat's history, her patrol and the action in which she was sunk. In addition, valuable tactical information has been obtained from the C.O., and the Naval Staff has been enabled to initiate counter-measures against the new torpedo. The methods by which all this information is promulgated are discussed in section H below.

D. THE HANDLING OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAPTURE AND ARRIVAL AT C.S.D.I.C.

a) The Promulgation of Instructions

Early in the war C.B.3074 "The Treatment and Handling of Prisoners of War in Ships effecting capture" was issued ~~and should be consulted~~. It contains full instructions on the handling of prisoners at sea and on shore so long as they are in naval custody, and was written on the basis of our general experiences. A.F.O's were also issued from time to time to bring this promulgation up to date. These instructions are generally covered by the following remarks.

b) Segregation

In order to ensure successful interrogation later it is essential that all officers taken prisoner should be kept entirely separate from their men and it is an advantage if possible for the Petty Officers to be kept in a third group. Although captors ~~sometimes make the mistake themselves owing to the difficulties of language,~~ {owing to the difficulties of language sometimes mistake officers for ratings themselves} it was almost unknown for officers to attempt to pass themselves {off} as ratings. The Geneva Convention in any case lays down that prisoners {ps/w} must give their name, rank and number. If officers are given the opportunity to talk to their men they will always attempt to give them a last minute lecture on the necessity of maintaining silence when interrogated by the enemy. At least one case occurred in which {a} U-boat C.O's ~~were~~ {was} allowed to address ~~their~~ {his} men on ~~one~~ {some} pretext or another, ~~they~~ {officers will} always make use of such an opportunity. One U-boat C.O. was allowed to address his men on the Quarter Deck of the ship which had captured them while the body of a dead prisoner {p/w} was consigned to the sea. He spoke in German and none of the British ship's company understood what he was saying. It was subsequently discovered at C.S.D.I.C. that he had given ~~them~~ {his men} a very strong security lecture and had not spoken at all about their dead comrade.

Some difficulty was experienced during the course of the war in impressing on Army escorts the necessity of keeping prisoners {ps/w} rigidly segregated. They were untrained in intelligence and did not appreciate the importance of preventing officers from speaking to men. In consequence, it was necessary to stress the need for segregation on the arrival of almost every batch of prisoners. The kind of mentality we had to fight is illustrated by the case of an American Army officer who, when it was suggested that the officers should be kept separate, asked why on earth they should not share the discomforts of riding in a lorry with their men.

c) No Interrogation in Ships effecting Capture

It was strongly laid down that no attempt should be made to interrogate enemy prisoners {ps/w} before they arrived at C.S.D.I.C; where this happened the prisoners {ps/w} were forewarned as to the subjects on which we were interested and the success of the C.S.D.I.C. system, with all its aids, imperilled. Inept interrogation by unqualified officers would not obtain the required results and would be harmful to all subsequent interrogation. The only occasion on which proper interrogation was allowed was when a qualified interrogator was available at sea, which only occurred very rarely. This ban on interrogation did not however extend to ~~a ban on~~ {forbidding} informal conversation and every encouragement might be given {to ps/w} to talk ~~themselves~~ {of their own accord} when their resistance was low immediately after capture. When fished out of the water and brought into a warm wardroom and given a meal and a tot of rum they might talk on subjects which it would later be difficult to persuade them to discuss. The dangers inherent even in such informal conversation were nevertheless great. In one instance a corvette which had just picked up some U-boat survivors,

signalled that one prisoner {p/w} had described a mine which U-boats could release when underneath an A/S vessel, the mine being designed to explode as it rose beneath the keel of the enemy ship. It was known in Admiralty that no such mine existed but C-in-C Western Approaches immediately repeated this signal to all the ships under his command in the Atlantic and it took some time before he and his ships could be disillusioned on this point. In the meanwhile those engaged in hunting U-boats had naturally to some extent become ~~possessed~~ {obsessed} with a psychological fear of such a weapon and their work had suffered by the restriction which this totally unnecessary signal had put upon their efforts.

d) Disposal of Prisoners {Ps/w} by the Navy

So long as prisoners {ps/w} are in King's Ships the responsibility of guarding them and looking after them rests with the Navy. The Army is responsible for handling {all} prisoners {ps/w} ashore and on arrival in U.K. prisoners {they} are always handed over to the military authorities for custody and disposal. Admiralty was generally forewarned during the war when naval prisoners {ps/w} might be expected and arrangements were then always made before hand with the War Office for the prisoners {ps/w} to be met and ~~to be~~ taken to C.S.D.I.C. or held temporarily in cages, according to our interrogation requirements of the moment. If a large number {of p/w} was available or there was not sufficient accommodation available at C.S.D.I.C. at the time, it was sometimes necessary to send interrogators to cages in order to select ~~those~~ {p/w for C.S.D.I.C.} prisoners ~~whom it was desired to bring to C.S.D.I.C.~~ Despite occasional errors and misunderstandings the Army always co-operated very fully with the Admiralty in all such arrangements. Interrogation at cages had of necessity to be sketchy and it would have been unwise to make any endeavour to obtain useful intelligence there since there since there was no means of checking its veracity {and we should have shown our hand prematurely}. Interrogators who were selecting prisoners {ps/w} at cages confined themselves to an appreciation of the knowledge and usefulness ~~to us~~ of the prisoners ~~concerned~~ {individual ps/w}. The interrogators' experience and their knowledge of {current} Admiralty requirements ~~at the moment~~ enabled them generally to make the right selection without any difficulty.

e) Interrogation at the Port of Arrival

It sometimes happened that a local C-in-C attempted to insist on interrogators being sent to a port of arrival in order to obtain {immediate} operational information from prisoners {ps/w} ~~immediately. The D.N.I.~~ As a result of experience {D.N.I.} always refused such requests; it was found that such interrogation yielded no results which were sufficiently firm as to be worth while, ~~they~~ vitiated the chance of successful interrogation at C.S.D.I.C. and ~~apart from the low quality intelligence available they~~ effected no saving in time. ~~The C-in-C~~ The Nore on more than one occasion attempted to insist on interrogators being sent to his Command to interrogate E-boat prisoners, particularly when it was suspected that they might have been mine-laying. It was found in the course of time that by arranging for such prisoners {ps/w} to be brought by the quickest possible means to C.S.D.I.C. it was possible to guarantee to C-in-C ~~The Nore~~ that he would have accurate operational intelligence within 24 hours. This system did not of course work efficiently in the early months of the war but when the machinery for interrogation had been brought to a high pitch by about 1943 such a guarantee was not only possible but was {also} always fulfilled.

E. INTERROGATION PERSONNEL

a) Interrogators

The number of interrogators was constantly increased during the war to meet new requirements {and} the increasing numbers of prisoners {ps/w} captured and to cope with the larger amount of information which became available with the development of the interrogation system. The intake of interrogators must always be governed by factors such as these and ~~it is important to foresee developments~~ since interrogators cannot be pulled out of hat as required {it is important to foresee future developments}. Depending on the character of the individual, his quickness, his interest in the work, ~~and~~ his previous background and his knowledge of German, it took from a minimum of one month to a maximum of six {months} to train an interrogator sufficiently to be able to rely on him or to be able to send him if necessary to a foreign station with the knowledge that he would be able to fulfill [sic] all requirements.

No hard and fast rule can be set as to the type of officer who is likely to make a good interrogator. It was sometimes thought that ~~lawyers~~ by reason of their experience in the courts {lawyers} would make good interrogators, but it was shown by experience both in U.K. and America that this was far from necessarily so. The only civilian occupation which as a general rule could be taken as pointing to a likely capacity for interrogation was that of journalism and several journalists made very efficient interrogators.

Much of our success was probably due to the fact that nearly all the interrogators were comparatively young. With one exception none of those trained in Admiralty was over 35. The Germans themselves used much older officers as interrogators but the advantage of interrogators being of roughly the same age as the prisoner {p/w} whom they had to interrogate was very great since they were able to enter into the mentality of the prisoner {p/w} without any exertion on their own part.

Since the duties of an interrogator are not those of an interpreter and mental agility is a more important requisite than good grammar, perfect German was never insisted upon and interrogators were sometimes accepted for training whose knowledge of German was rusty but who appeared likely to brush it up quickly. If, however, an interrogator was not able within a short time to converse fluently, even if incorrectly in German, and to follow a U-boat rating talking idiomatic slang with a strong local accent, he was unlikely to ever be of much use to us. A prisoner {p/w} was always more impressed by some-one who showed the necessary knowledge and had the intelligence to follow up his {a} point than by some-one who spoke perfect German but automatically asked one question after another.

Since interrogation is largely a matter of the psychology of the interrogator, officers were found who, after a short experience, felt themselves unhappy in the work and psychologically unsuited for it; there being no point in retaining in such work those who were not interested and happy in it, ~~such~~ {these} officers were invariably released.

b) Sea Experience

Experience has shown that while it is not essential for officers selected as interrogators to have had previous sea time, no interrogator can do his work properly unless he has a proper grounding in the ways of ships at sea. It was, of course, preferable for an interrogator to have spent some time at sea previously, preferably as a Watchkeeping officer. ~~Should~~ {If} they {have} not ~~have~~

{had} such experience officers should be given every opportunity of acquainting themselves with ships and navigation in order to be on a level with the Germans whom they are required to interrogate. Arrangements were made throughout the war for interrogators and W.R.N.S. officers to visit the home ports as circumstances permitted and to inspect sea-going ships. In particular, all interrogators were given the opportunity of visiting and inspecting and occasionally going to sea in H.M.S. "GRAPH", the captured U 570. While interrogators were encouraged to gain sea experience where possible there was only one officer in the naval section who, on his own initiative, took the trouble to do so frequently, and he often spent his days off with Coastal Forces in the Channel. {Note: Standing instructions forbade him to take part in any operation where there was a risk of his falling into Enemy hands.} The family ties, desire for a restful change and lack of initiative which prevented the others from taking the same opportunity to arrange similar trips for themselves were not really sufficient reason for their not having ~~taken the same course~~ {done so}.

It was often hard ~~to find time~~ when the section was busy for officers {to find time} to go to sea but the sacrifice and the temporary additional burden put on others would in the long run have fully been repaid by some form of compulsion.

c) Specialists

Early in the war there was no immediate need for any full time specialist interrogators and those available were competent to make themselves acquainted with all the necessary subjects. When, however, the German Navy began to develop new types of craft with novel propulsion, new types of torpedo, Radar, etc., it became apparent that at least one interrogator with engineering training was essential. One such interrogator, who was later joined by a second, was found and the information which he was in due course able to obtain from ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} amounted to a very large percentage of all the available Intelligence obtained from ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w}. It is essential that the need for a highly qualified {technical} interrogator should be appreciated sufficiently far in advance for him to be trained in the normal background of interrogation and ~~to~~ {so} be ready to cover ~~technical~~ {his own} subjects when they become of importance. {The Navy's need for technical intelligence must always be greater than that of the other services because, while the Army and Air Force can always be certain of capturing examples of new enemy weapons within a short while of their first operational use; it is only by great good fortune that the Navy can ever capture an enemy vessel under the conditions of modern warfare.}

We were fortunate in obtaining as ~~an~~ interrogator{s} ~~an~~ {several} officers who had had considerable experience in anti-submarine warfare and who ~~was~~ {were} therefore fully conversant with the reverse side of the picture ~~when it became imperative to~~ {and could} obtain the most detailed information on the procedure and tactics of U-boats.

While these two officers were qualified by previous experience to cover subjects which would not otherwise have been properly understood it was also our practice to encourage the original general interrogators to make themselves expert in various different fields. Since they were called upon to interrogate on a large variety of general subjects this was not always successful and they were not always available to handle specialist work when it turned up. It was nevertheless shown to be very important for such interrogators to make themselves familiar with all the details of at least one specialist subject, for instance, the training methods of the German Navy or the organisation of its commands.

d) The Writing and Editing of Reports

The system whereby the results of interrogation were promulgated is described in detail in section H below. During the first half of the war the reports of interrogation were largely compiled by {the} interrogators {themselves} ~~who were those taking part in the interrogation~~; this system was satisfactory so long as we were not handling a large number of prisoners {ps/w} and time was of no immediate consequence. By the beginning of 1942, however, it was apparent that the ~~original~~ interrogators would no longer have the leisure to handle the writing of reports and an officer was specially appointed for these reports {to write them}; the experiment was not entirely satisfactory since this officer in the natural course of events ~~must become~~ {himself became} an interrogator, and various officers thereafter took turns at writing the reports. The ideal system was not evolved until early in 1944 when the whole job of writing was placed on the shoulders of W.R.N.S. officers who, having worked in the section for some time, were ~~by that time~~ fully competent to handle the job ~~full time~~ with the occasional collaboration and aid of the interrogators. It is recommended that such a system should be adopted in future.

e) W.R.N.S. Personnel

As the work increased the W.R.N.S. staff in the naval section was likewise increased. By the beginning of 1942 there was only one W.R.N.S. officer in the section but at the end of the war there were four, all of whom were employed in writing reports. A staff of shorthand typists was also built up during this period and at its peak consisted of five W.R.N.S. Petty Officers and one Chief Wren, who in addition to her supervisory duties, was responsible for the details of the office work. It became clear during the later years of the war that in order to ensure the immediate supply and promulgation of all Intelligence available, it was essential to have ~~both~~ W.R.N.S. officers to write reports and ~~the typists~~ {WRNS ratings} to deal with reports of interrogations as they took place and the large amount of typing involved in writing the fuller reports. When this W.R.N.S. staff was not available early in the war, the promulgation of Intelligence took a very much long(er) time and was in consequence of less use to the Naval Staff.

f) Officer-in-Charge

The selection of the Officer-in-Charge of the whole interrogation section is probably the most difficult task of all. He must naturally be acquainted with all aspects of interrogation, he must be an expert interrogator himself, he must not only have the confidence of all those under him but must also appreciate the capabilities of individuals and to be able to co-ordinate their work, the job becoming progressively more important as the number of prisoners {ps/w}, the amount of intelligence and the staff in the section increase. It is recommended that the Officer-in-Charge should generally be older than those under him and of a higher rank. It was perhaps unfortunate during this war that the Officer-in-Charge, despite recommendations for his promotion, was a Lieutenant-Commander, ~~who was~~ little senior to some of his subordinates and junior to his opposite numbers in the Army and Air Force. The Officer-in-Charge must not be led by his own inclinations to do more than the minimum interrogation since it is essential that {at least} one ~~man~~ {officer} should have a complete grasp of all that is going on, should be in constant touch with the Admiralty and should be able to organise interrogation in such a way that the minimum of time is wasted and the maximum ~~properly employed~~ {effort obtained}.

F. GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION IN ADMIRALTY

a) General

At the beginning of the war the Headquarters liaison with prisoner-of-war interrogation was contained in N.I.D.1., the German geographical section. Somewhat later it was found desirable to make a separate N.I.D. section, N.I.D.XI, to handle all prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence, both Italian and German. This arrangement held good until the end of 1941 when the Admiralty liaison{s} reverted to the geographical section{s} and were called N.I.D.1/PW (German) {and} 3/PW (Italian). There is no doubt as a result of {O}ur experience {made it clear} that it is essential for the prisoner of war {p/w} Intelligence sections to come under the respective geographical sections concerned in order to ensure proper correlation of all sources.

b) Duties

The {German p/w} section in Admiralty, which for convenience will be called 1/PW, acted as a feeder to and from C.S.D.I.C. Generally speaking all information obtained from C.S.D.I.C. was passed through 1/PW to the users and all requirements were passed from 1/PW to C.S.D.I.C. In order that the maximum of prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence should be obtained without being adulterated by extraneous knowledge which interrogators may {might} unwittingly have picked up it was found desirable to control to some extent the general background to which they had access. This does not mean that they were not provided with {a} very full background from other sources but they were nevertheless prevented from obtaining too full a picture, such as was available in the Admiralty, in order that their own results might not be vitiated in adulteration{ed} with other material whose source was also {possibly} questionable. Only by {in} this way could it be ensured that prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence remained a pure source of Intelligence of its own whose results could be seen separately and compared with Intelligence derived by other means. Prisoner-of-war {p/w} intelligence would have lost much of its value if it had been impossible to state {discover} how much of it was in reality derived solely from prisoners {ps/w}. It may be remarked in passing that the Air {Force} interrogation section, in its reports at least, mixed its sources of intelligence to such an extent that it was often quite impossible to ascertain where one source began or finished or where conjecture and interpretation began {were inserted}.

1/PW was in direct touch with all N.I.D. sections and with those divisions of the Naval Staff, such as the Anti-U-boat Division and the Director of Torpedoes and Mining, which were most directly interested in the results of prisoner-of-war interrogation. It was in constant touch by telephone with the commands which had a special interest in interrogation, such as C-in-C Western Approaches (U-boats) and C-in-C The Nore (E-boats). The staffs of these commands would often themselves ring up with urgent questions to which they required the answer. 1/PW also kept in direct touch with the Staff Officers (Intelligence) at the ports of arrival of prisoners {ps/w} and who acted as D.N.I.'s agents in obtaining preliminary information, in ensuring segregation, in providing lists of names, etc. when prisoners {ps/w} arrived.

c) 1/PW.'s position in N.I.D.1.

1/PW's position in N.I.D.1 was to some extent an unusual one since it is not normally the prerogative for the {of a} geographical section to have complete control over one source of intelligence; a geographical section normally obtains its intelligence from several distinct sources of which it is the user and not the controller. At the same time 1/PW had a very great degree of independence and in many respects acted as though it were a separate section, only referring to

N.I.D.1 where authoritative [sic] decisions were necessary and even then frequently having direct access to the deputy directors.

It was perhaps unavoidable in the early and middle stages of the war that 1/PW by reason of its direct contact with the Germans, unintentionally came to contain the only experts in the details of the German Navy, and {consequently} had referred to it nearly all {many} matters which required interpretation and promulgation; since 1/PW and the Admiralty had access to every other source of Intelligence this probably did no harm, nevertheless, in the course of time, as the amount of prisoner of war {pure p/w} intelligence available and of prisoners {ps/w} themselves increased, this additional work put too great a strain on 1/PW and it became impossible to carry out both functions adequately. N.I.D.1 was reorganised accordingly in the autumn of 1943 and officers who had been trained in 1/PW were drafted into N.I.D.1 itself where their experience, which their predecessors had not had, made possible a much fuller interpretation of all sources of German naval intelligence. It is no reflection on those who were previously responsible for the correlation of German naval intelligence to state that they were not fully capable of understanding the whole picture; never having been in direct contact with the German Navy and frequently being unable to read or speak German, they could not be expected to be able to appreciate the picture as a whole.

d) The Editing of Reports

1/PW received from C.S.D.I.C. the various reports which are dealt with in detail in section H below, edited them in the light of its own knowledge and referred them as occasion required to the experts in each subject before publication. It also made all the arrangements for the printing of C.B.04051. As the output increased this work required the full time attention of one officer. By reason of the fact that the interrogators were to some extent kept separate from the Admiralty, they were not always able to appreciate what intelligence was worth promulgating and how much of it, for reason of security, should be suppressed; nor could they provide the Staff comment which, as a result of their knowledge, put prisoner of war {p/w} Intelligence in the correct light. It should also be noted that it was necessary for the officer responsible for such editing to correct not only the nautical phraseology but also the English in which some of the reports were written.

e) Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence /Prisoner{s} of War

The officer who was originally in charge of N.I.D.XI and subsequently N.I.D.1/PW was during 1943 made Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Prisoners of War {ADNI/PW} in order to correlate the production of Intelligence from all enemy naval prisoners of war {ps/w}, German, Italian, {and} Japanese, to decide policy and to provide the N.I.D. liaison with the Admiralty and War Office staffs responsible for British prisoners of war {ps/w}.² On assuming this position he ceased to be directly interested in detailed intelligence or its promulgation. In the light of our experience it is however questionable whether this post was necessary since it did not in fact provide full time employment and, it must be admitted, was to some extent created in order to put younger officers{,} who had a better appreciation of the modern methods required{,} in charge of the details of the production of prisoner of war Intelligence {German p/w interrogation}.³

f) General Duties

In addition to the day to day work of prisoner of war {p/w} intelligence 1/PW was concerned with certain related aspects of Intelligence, most of which are dealt with separately below, i.e.

² This was Lt Col B F Trench RM (retd).

³ Possibly a reference to McFadyean, who was however in the US at the time of Trench's promotion.

Censorship (section M), Documents (section O), the control of the repatriation of German prisoners (section P), etc. It also supervised and recruited the necessary staff. During the period when it fell upon 1/PW to interpret and promulgate most aspects of intelligence of the German Navy it was also continually consulted on, if it did not originate, a large variety of matters which concerned German naval intelligence as a whole and not {specifically p/w} ~~prisoner of war intelligence as part of that whole.~~

g) Staff

The number of personnel required in 1/PW varied slightly with the work it was called upon to undertake. On an average it consisted of three naval officers, one female civilian officer and one typist and clerk; the naval officers handled respectively the routine work of the section{, of which he was head}, the editing and production of reports and censorship and general questions; the female officer, while assisting in the general work of the section, was particularly concerned in the handling of documents and the ~~marking~~ {distribution} in Admiralty of ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} Intelligence obtained by the other services.

G. SUCCESSES AND RESULTS OF GERMAN PRISONER OF WAR INTELLIGENCE {INTERROGATION}

a) First Phase - until mid 1942

During this period German naval ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} intelligence was only just getting into its stride; a vast amount of background ~~and of intelligence~~ {knowledge} was being built up as a result of which the results obtained from then onwards became of {the} greatest importance. The intelligence produced during this phase consisted largely of historical accounts of the patrols of individual enemy units, mostly U-boats, and of the build up of the German Navy; in comparison with what became available later there was very little technical or specialised [sic] information; to a large extent this was conditioned by the state of the German Navy itself which did not introduce much in the way of new equipment until 1942.

During this phase the reliability of the results of interrogation only began to be generally known and appreciated and interrogation was in fact not brought to a fine art until about mid 1942 when as a result of the previous years' experience and the opening of the new C.S.D.I.C., the output and quality of ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} Intelligence increased many-fold.

Two instances may be quoted of the unwillingness of the experts to accept the results of interrogation during this period. Interrogators constantly reported that there was overwhelming evidence from ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} to the effect that German U-boats were capable of diving to 600 feet and deeper; Flag Officer (Submarines) and his constructors were unwilling to believe this evidence although it became overwhelmingly strong, until after the capture of U 570 and her trials with Royal ~~Navy~~ {Naval} personnel, it was discovered that British experience was not the only criterion and that German U-boats were so well constructed that diving to depths of over 600 feet presented no difficulties. Had this been appreciated earlier steps might have been taken sooner than they were in fact to design depth charges capable of being set to explode at over 550 feet, the maximum setting available during the first part of the war.

The other example which comes to mind is that of the calibre of {the} main armament of German Narvik class destroyers. ~~Prisoner~~ {P/w} after ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} stated that these destroyers carried 15 cm. (5.9 inch) guns; ~~and~~ {apart from there being no reason for the p/w to exaggerate}

their statements having been checked by all the means available to us, it was almost un{in}conceivable that this information should be wrong; nevertheless the naval constructors to whom the matter was referred continued to state that it was impossible for a 2,400 ton ship to carry such armament and in consequence the information that these destroyers carried such heavy guns was not promulgated to the Fleet, which was in constant danger of being confronted by them, until long after the information had been available. Even after an Admiralty message was {had been} made with a very high priority {probability} grading there were many who refused to accept this information until a Narvik class destroyer went ashore in Brittany in July 1944 and fell into our hands.

b) **Second Phase - mid 1942 to June 1944**

By the middle of 1942, when the German Navy began to develop new methods and new technical devices on a large scale, the naval interrogators had built up such a large background and their reliability had become so well known that from henceforth the results of interrogation became of vital importance to the war at sea. In the spring of 1942 one interrogator was able to provide a full description of the Submarine Bubble Target, a device whereby U-boats were able to produce a false target for our asdic and to escape behind this screen, and in consequence the S.B.T., although a nuisance, never had the effect for which it was designed. Later in 1942 another interrogator obtained such full details of the German Search Receiver, which was designed to give warning of Allied radar contacts, that henceforth N.I.D. was always fully aware of the development of this device. During the next two years naval interrogators also kept the Naval Staff very fully informed on the new torpedoes which Germany was developing and their essentials were always known to the Admiralty, which was able to design countermeasures before they became operational. It is not suggested that the existence [sic] of such weapons and devices did not become known through other sources; the importance of the information obtained from prisoners lay in the detailed description of them which made the design of counter-measures possible. When these and other devices eventually fell into our hands it was always found that the information obtained at C.S.D.I.C. was extraordinarily accurate and full.

Fortunately the officers responsible for receiving, appreciating and using this information had always realised its value and had acted accordingly; while gratified {later} to find that the Intelligence had been accurate neither they nor we had any ground for regret that it had not been believed earlier as in the case of the diving depths of U-boats mentioned above. This very full technical information would never have been available with such a degree of accuracy had we not obtained the services of an interrogator who was a qualified engineer in sufficient time.

c) **Third Phase - June 1944 to the Capitulation of Germany**

With the Allied landings in Normandy prisoner-of-war {p/w} intelligence began to take another form. Whereas previously it had supplied a very large percentage of our detailed information on German naval weapons and technical developments and no other similar source had been available, from now on we began to capture large amounts {much} of the equipment itself and all the various handbooks and documents concerning them {it}. It was in consequence no longer so important to concentrate on all available evidence, and one subject after another could be dropped so far as interrogation was concerned. Until captured evidence became available, however, the interrogators continued to supply the fullest possible information.

After June 1944 the naval war moved much closer to the U.K. and whereas we had been used to interrogating prisoners {ps/w} from U-boats which had been sunk well out into the Atlantic, we now began to receive prisoners {ps/w} from German units which had been sunk in the Channel and off our coasts only a short while before; whereas previously by far the greater number of our prisoners had come from U-boats {in the Atlantic} we now began to capture survivors from various types of Small Battle Units, from U-boats working close inshore and from E-boats which were threatening our lines of communication to the Continent. As a result of all these factors we ceased to interrogate all prisoners to the fullest extent, a process which had started when large numbers of U-boats were sunk in 1943, and concentrated on the most vital Intelligence, which was now chiefly operational. The results of this new type of interrogation are all on record and need only be referred to in a few examples. The Schnorkel{, a} device whereby U-boats were able to operate under water for long periods, was introduced early in 1944 and with its aid the U-boats were able to operate closer inshore. It became most important to obtain the greatest possible information on the tactical use of this device and on the operational orders of the U-boats fitted with it in order that the appropriate counter-measures could be taken; this information was obtained in the fullest measure and often in sufficient time for steps to be taken to counteract the effect of other U-boats which were following on the tail of those we had sunk. Soon after the landings in Normandy the Germans began to operate the Small Battle Units; these consisted of a variety of new weapons such as explosive motor boats, various types of midget U-boat, controlled torpedoes etc. Survivors from such craft were always brought to C.S.D.I.C. with the greatest possible speed and we were able to keep abreast of their development and to provide fairly accurate intelligence as to the future movements and operations of these weapons.

A Forward Interrogation Unit, consisting {both} of interrogators of long experience and others who had been specially trained, was made available to the Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, and landed in Normandy very early on. It moved up the coast with the armies and was able to provide operational intelligence on the spot of the very greatest value and to maintain constant touch with Admiralty and C.S.D.I.C. In similar circumstances in the future it is essential that a similar organisation should be set up. The activities of the F.I.U. are the subject of a separate paper.

{Margin Note: Are they!
Yes}

H. DISTRIBUTION OF PRISONER OF WAR INTELLIGENCE

a) General

Early in the war it was rarely the case that information was of such importance that it needed immediate dissemination and naval prisoner of war {p/w} intelligence was often not available to its {ultimate} users until a final report of interrogation had been written, ~~and was~~ circulated {in Admiralty for comment} and printed; in consequence it often did not reach its user {authorities outside Admiralty} until several months after it had been obtained; no great loss, however, resulted since it consisted largely of background material which was only a {of} long term usefulness. The number of prisoners {ps/w} available was also originally small and time could be taken over interrogation. It was only when the prisoners of the BISMARCK, for instance, were captured that the promulgation of the results of interrogation became of immediate importance.

The full system of promulgation outlined below developed, therefore, in accordance with the requirements of the moment.

Each interrogation of every prisoner was always dictated to a typist by the interrogator concerned a short while after it had been completed. Copies of each interrogation were available for reference at C.S.D.I.C., to the editors who compiled the Summary and the final reports referred to below, and in Admiralty.

b) Immediate Intelligence

1/PW, which was continually obtaining the views and requirements of sections and divisions by telephone and by personal contacts in the Admiralty, was at the same time receiving by telephone and by despatch rider the immediate results of the first typed reports of interrogation at C.S.D.I.C., when such information was sufficiently important to need immediate promulgation ~~and~~ {or} comment which would help further interrogation 1/PW passed ~~such information~~ {it} to all concerned ~~both to the~~ {whether in} Admiralty ~~and to the Staffs of~~ {or} the home ports. As occasion required, and particularly after the landings in Normandy, such information was also signalled when it was of operational importance.

c) Preliminary Reports

When a new batch of prisoners {ps/w} was received from a particular enemy unit the ~~preliminary~~ {first} results of their interrogation were embodied in a preliminary report, usually two or three days after the prisoners {ps/w} had arrived at C.S.D.I.C. These preliminary reports which were generally only two or three pages long, were designed to give a general idea of the information likely to be obtained or available, in order to elicit enquiries from interested authorities. A digest of such preliminary reports was generally signalled to commands concerned and to Washington and given a wide distribution in Admiralty. The preliminary reports themselves were generally only given a small distribution in N.I.D.

d) Final Reports

From the beginning of the war until 1944 the results of interrogation of the survivors of each enemy naval unit were published in the C.B.04051 series, which eventually reached some 103 issues. The editing, proof reading and publication of these reports ~~naturally~~ took a considerable time and it was {usually} not ~~often~~ until four or more months after the prisoners {ps/w} had been captured that the printed report became available. During the early stages of the war this made little difference since the information they contained was chiefly of an historical nature or such as required no immediate action. When one hundred separate issues of this C.B. had been made, {each} involving distribution to some five hundred recipients, the number of volumes to be accounted for had reached almost unmanageable proportions; by this time moreover (1944) the quality and quantity of the information obtained from prisoners {ps/w} had so changed that it was no longer thought possible to continue this series with all the delays and difficulties which it involved. A final issue was made summarizing the knowledge which had been obtained of the German U-boat arm (C.B.04051(103)) and thereafter ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} intelligence was promulgated by the other means described below. One disadvantage of the system of promulgation of Intelligence by C.B. was that it did not always reach {many of} those who were most interested in it; C.B.'s are generally so constricted in their circulation because they require accounting at every step, that junior officers were discouraged from reading them. Despite ~~this circulation of~~ {to} over five hundred ~~authorities~~ {recipients} this series was moreover not supplied to the A/S vessels which were fighting the U-

boats, and was only available to the officers in such ships at the A/S schools and at their bases. The smallest units to which the series was distributed were cruisers, which were only remotely connected with the type of Intelligence available.

e) ~~Weekly Prisoner-of-War~~ {P/w} Summary

In the middle of 1943 the amount of {valuable} information which was constantly available {being obtained} and required quick promulgation became so great that it was decided to issue a weekly Summary of the information obtained from German naval prisoners-of-war {ps/w}, and the Summary was issued thereafter at weekly intervals until shortly after the surrender of Germany, when it had reached over one hundred and thirty issues. Depending on the amount of information available in any one week it ranged from half a dozen to fifty foolscap pages. A special staff of W.R.N.S officers was trained to write the Summary and it was edited and multigraphed in Admiralty. Bound volumes of the summary are available in N.I.D.1. Editors kept a day to day record of the results of interrogation and compiled them into the Summary at the end of every week. It was only as a result of very hard work that it was possible to issue this Summary in such a way that the latent information in it was never more than one week old. By giving the Summary a wide distribution, but at the same time ensuring that it did not go to authorities or officers who were not aware of its drawbacks, it was possible to give a large range of recipients a constant view of the main lines of German naval development; the German torpedo developments, for instance, were available not only to the Director of Torpedoes and Mining, who was immediately responsible, but also to all other authorities whom it interested incidentally.

Although edited in the light of our knowledge and checked as necessary by telephoned reference to experts in any particular subject, the Summary did not set out to be more than a compilation of raw Intelligence which {and} was only graded {only by reference} to the reliability and knowledge of the prisoners {ps/w} producing it{, and not by the probability of its correctness}. As such it showed its worth many times over, but a constant watch had to be kept in order to ensure that its recipients did not overestimate its value. One prisoner's {p/w's} statement that Germany had developed 75 knot torpedoes might {for instance} have been included although it was not considered accurate, merely in order to record one of a chain of statements which might add up to something in the long run; a Staff Officer in one of the home commands who was not aware of the prisoner-of-war Intelligence {p/w interrogation} system could, however, misinterpret such a statement; in one case when copies of the Summary were being {found to have been} circulated in the A/S vessels of the Plymouth Command, and {where} such statements were being taken at their face value, immediate steps had to be taken to prevent the summary being circulated in this way {such circulation in the future. Similarly the premature disclosure of intelligence concerning midget U-boats gave rise to many reports being received that they had been seen and attacked in the Channel long before they became operational.}

f) ~~Substitutes for C.B.04051~~

When, as stated above, it became necessary to cease the issue of the printed C.B. reports their place was taken by multigraphed final reports written in much the same form but excluding information which it was no longer worth while promulgating and these reports, having been circulated to staff departments concerned for comment, were sent to all interested authorities. The C.B. series had contained such technical information as became available from each particular unit but when this information reached large proportions and was being obtained from a selection of prisoners {ps/w} from different units at the same time it became impossible, if not unwise, to

promulgate it piece by piece; to meet this a second series of technical reports was started which was designed to promulgate technical Intelligence when the information on any particular subject became sufficiently firm {& complete} to warrant its publication; it was in this way possible to edit the information obtained from a variety of prisoners {ps/w} and only to promulgate {publish} it when it was known {that} sufficient had been obtained to give a clear picture.

These final and technical reports are all available in bound volumes in N.I.D.1.

g) United States "Spot Item"s.

The United States interrogation section in Washington (see section K below) whose system of promulgation involved a different method to that in the Admiralty, instituted a series of "Spot Item"s and circulated the statements of prisoners on any one particular subject in reports varying from a few lines to two or three pages; although edited by the interrogation section these spot items did not generally cover the remarks of more than one or at the most two prisoners {ps/w} and were not submitted to outside experts before promulgation; nor were they held up until a considerable body of Intelligence had been obtained on the particular subject involved. By reason of the close touch kept by our interrogators with all the users of prisoner-of-war {p/w} intelligence and because of the development of the weekly summary this system was not used or found desirable {in Admiralty}.

h) Other Methods of Promulgation

As stated above the C.B.04051 series did not always reach the officers who were themselves physically engaging the enemy; the same remark applies to the other {later formal} reports and to the weekly Summary, which only reached H.M. {King's} Ships themselves on the rarest occasions. While it was undesirable for raw Intelligence to reach those who could not appreciate it, the need was constantly felt to make the considered results {of interrogation} available to watchkeeping officers in {the} smaller sea-going vessels, which were themselves fighting the U-boats, E-boats etc; whenever interrogators came into personal contact with such officers it was found that through no fault of their own they were lamentably ignorant of a large amount of information on the enemy, much of which would be useful to them.

In order to meet this need articles were, whenever possible, written for and published in such publications as it was known were read in the wardrooms of H.M. {King's} Ships and by the personnel of the aircraft {air-crews} of Coastal Command. The Director of the Anti-U-boat Division was himself most anxious that all available confirmed information should be known to officers of A/S vessels and encouraged the publication of material in C.B.04050, {the} Monthly A/S Bulletin. Such articles covered both the historical and tactical aspects {sides} of the patrols and sinkings of particular U-boats and more generalised information on the technical aspects of the enemy's U-boat effort. The Coastal Forces Review, which was published in the Admiralty for the benefit of our own Coastal Forces, and Coastal Command Review, published by the Air Ministry and circulated to air-crews of Coastal Command also often contained articles on various subjects derived from prisoner-of-war {p/w} interrogation. The officers of ships and aircraft directly engaged in fighting the enemy were thereby supplied by {with} a much fuller picture of the enemy's own thought and methods than could be obtained from technical C.B.s or short Admiralty messages.

The advantage of publishing prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence in such publications as the periodical reviews mentioned above and the Weekly Intelligence Report issued by N.I.D. was that these publications were in themselves of such a generally interesting nature that it was known that

despite the drawbacks involved in circulating printed reports which have to be accounted for, they would nevertheless be very widely read immediately after publication.

In addition to the method of promulgation outlined above ~~naval prisoner of war {p/w}~~ Intelligence, like intelligence derived from other sources, was issued from time to time in short memoranda such as "U.C"s and {in} Admiralty "A" Messages.

I. THE INTERROGATION SECTION'S PLACE IN THE ADMIRALTY

a) In N.I.D.

The naval interrogation section, although it worked at C.S.D.I.C., was theoretically and administratively in N.I.D. and all its officers were borne on the Headquarters staff. The C.S.D.I.C., being some 30 miles from London and there often, particularly in the later stages, being a very large amount of work to be done there, it was not possible for the interrogators to spend much time in Admiralty. They were nevertheless encouraged as opportunity permitted to visit Admiralty and to make themselves familiar with the work and requirements of N.I.D. in particular. It was always advisable and sometimes essential for interrogators themselves, and apart from 1/PW's own liaison duties, to visit and maintain contact with the users of ~~prisoner of war {p/w}~~ Intelligence. When topographical intelligence was required for instance, or when a ~~particular prisoner {p/w}~~ was available with detailed knowledge on a particular subject, the interrogator would discuss with the officers in N.I.D. ~~particularly~~ concerned the details of the information available and required. It was only by such personal contact that interrogators were able to keep abreast of the general body of intelligence as it became available; and their visits were also valuable in that they accumulated [sic] a great deal of knowledge about the German Navy which was not always put down on paper or appreciated by others in N.I.D; conversations often brought out points whose importance the interrogators had not appreciated and whose existence others had not been aware of. This fact made it all the more important to have officers in N.I.D. {proper} who had a {the} background training of interrogators.

b) With Other Admiralty Divisions

The interrogators, and in particular 1/PW ~~itself~~ kept in constant and direct touch with the divisions particularly interested in ~~prisoner of war {p/w}~~ intelligence, and as specialised interrogators came to be trained and available for various subjects they were encouraged frequently to visit Admiralty to discuss current trends with other divisions. Those with whom we had most to do were the Anti-U-boat Division, which was concerned in formulating and promulgating anti-U-boat policy, the Director of Torpedoes and Mining, whose Intelligence Officer was responsible for evaluating intelligence on enemy mines and torpedoes, and Flag Officer (Submarines) who was ~~mainly~~ {naturally} interested in the German U-boat Arm. Intimate touch was also kept with Coastal Command, which though not in Admiralty, was operated by it. All of these authorities came ~~in the course of time~~ to appreciate the great value of the results of ~~prisoner of war~~ Intelligence {p/w interrogation} and in the course of time such intelligence was asked for by them rather than having to be supplied to and {or} forced upon them. It was only their appreciation of the interrogators' work which made interrogation worth while because, ~~it was known~~ {knowing} that ~~it~~ {their work} was appreciated and {interrogators were encouraged} ~~because the necessary encouragement was thereby given to interrogators to do their best.~~

c) Operational Intelligence

For reasons of security it was generally inadvisable for interrogators to have direct access to those responsible for operational Intelligence and the liaison with operational Intelligence was therefore maintained by 1/PW and not by the interrogators themselves. It was in this way possible for ~~command~~ {comment} and background material to be made available to the interrogators in a suitable form and the danger of information being compromised by being repeated unwittingly to ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} was avoided.

d) Questionnaires

From time to time interested sections and divisions produced questionnaires of varying length on subjects of interest to themselves, either on request, when it was known that ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were available to answer questions on special subjects, or in order to brief interrogators on matters concerning which intelligence was required. These questionnaires were kept by the interrogators and, being constantly referred to, the subjects of interest were borne in mind. It was found that general questions such as "all available details concerning U-boats" were well-nigh useless, whereas specific questions, such as the frequency of a particular radar set were extremely helpful. In many cases, however close a touch interrogators kept with other authorities, they could not be expected to know that a particular item of intelligence was urgently required.

J. RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER SERVICES

a) The War Office

As stated above the War Office was responsible for the custody and handling of prisoners throughout the U.K. and for the running of C.S.D.I.C. ~~in particular. In the latter respect~~ It was through the Army that all arrangements were made for the custody of naval ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} at C.S.D.I.C., for the particular cells in which it was desired to place them, for their escort to and from interrogation rooms as required, for their exercise, for their covering by S.R., for the moving and allocation of S.P's and in fact for everything except the direct acquisition of Intelligence from the ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w}. The Air Force relied on the Army in exactly the same way. Despite occasional differences and difficulties the Army faithfully carried out its obligations towards the naval section and everything was done to make our work complete.

The results of our interrogation work were always made available to the Army and Air Force, and where a ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} appeared to have knowledge which was valuable to either of them they would be informed accordingly; we received reciprocal treatment from the other services. After a ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} had been finished with by the service primarily concerned he was always placed at the disposal of the other services for such interrogation as they might require.

b) The Air Ministry

Because the war at sea was fought {also} by Coastal Command which, though operated by {the} Air Ministry, was under Admiralty control for operational purposes, our relations had to be particularly [sic] close with the Air Ministry. The interrogation of U-boat crews, for instance, was solely our responsibility but they would often have been sunk by aircraft ~~in~~ {of} Coastal Command, which was therefore interested. It was unfortunate that despite Admiralty pressure an Air Force officer was never permanently attached to the naval section; this was the result of certain jealousies affecting personalities which though they should not have been allowed to influence events were nevertheless in the circumstances inevitable. Although however this liaison was in theory never fully

complete, a specialist Air Force officer was in fact nevertheless almost always available to assist in naval interrogation; the results of his work were published by N.I.D., although he remained under the control of the Air Force section.

In any future war in which the Air Force is directly concerned with the war at sea it is recommended that arrangements should be made from the outset for an Air Force officer to be attached permanently {to} and {be} under the control of the naval section.

It may be mentioned in passing that the Admiralty did not always see eye to eye with the method of promulgating prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence adopted by the Air Ministry; the latter did not seem fully to appreciate the need to keep prisoner-of-war {p/w} interrogation, which is only one of several sources of Intelligence, distinct from the others and the Air Force interrogation reports were inclined to contain much extraneous information and comment which it was not always easy to sift from the results of interrogation alone. While of little concern to the Admiralty when it affected matters which were solely of interest to the Air Ministry, this method created difficulties when the Air Ministry at one stage took to promulgating on its own information concerning the war at sea and in particular U-boats, in which Admiralty considered it should have the last word. In the final event satisfactory arrangements were made whereby all interrogation reports issued by the Air Ministry and containing naval material were submitted to the Admiralty for expert comment before publication.

The relationship between the naval interrogators and Coastal Command has been mentioned in section I above. Our contacts with the Fleet Air Arm, which may be very important in a future war, were almost non-existent [sic] for the reason that it had few problems which were not at the same time primarily those of Coastal Command, and until carrier-borne aircraft started to sink U-boats fairly late in the war the Fleet Air Arm was responsible for the destruction of very few units from which they took prisoners {p/w} were taken. When carrier-borne aircraft did begin to play an important part in the war at sea the needs of the authorities which operated them were to some extent satisfied by the supply to them of our reports, while their Intelligence requirements continued to be covered by our liaison with Coastal Command. Had the naval air arm been represented in Admiralty by their {other} officers than was the case it is possible that a closer liaison would have been maintained; it was in any event desirable.

K. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR ALLIES AND WITH AUTHORITIES OUTSIDE THE U.K.

a) United States

Very full and complete liaison was maintained with the United States Navy from shortly before Pearl Harbour until after the German capitulation. Before America entered the war an officer was attached {by the Navy Department} to the naval interrogation section at C.S.D.I.C. by the Navy Department, and on the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany was therefore well versed in the problems of prisoner-of-war interrogation. With the help of a {British} naval officer from C.S.D.I.C. who was sent to the United States and remained there for some nine months,⁴ he formed and built up the {U.S.} naval interrogation section, which was called Op16Z {Op-16-Z}.⁵

The United States interrogation methods were basically the same as ours since they were derived from our experiences, and the United States Army was generally responsible for the

⁴ Probably Ralph Izzard.

⁵ This was at [Fort Hunt](#) ('PO Box 1142'), a former coastal defence installation near Washington, D.C.

handling of prisoners and for the interrogation centre in Washington in the same way as {that} the War Office was in England. Until shortly after the Allied landings in Normandy a British naval interrogator was permanently attached to the section in Washington and an American officer to C.S.D.I.C. in U.K; these officers were changed approximately every six months in order to ensure the fullest exchange of experience. Whether in Washington ~~and~~ {or} at C.S.D.I.C. these liaison officers were employed exactly as though they belonged to the country in which they were. All results of interrogation were exchanged both by signal and in written reports between London and Washington, the respective sections being responsible for promulgating each other's Intelligence in the two countries. After June 1944 large numbers of American naval interrogators came to England and the Continent and worked in very close co-operation with ourselves, the C.S.D.I.C. in U.K. having been put at the disposal of the Americans jointly with the British.

It would be ingenuous to maintain that the United States naval interrogation section was as successful as we were ourselves. It produced a great deal of valuable information, but for a variety of reasons never attained the same position as the naval section at C.S.D.I.C. Despite the well-known American capacity for concentration, organisation and hard work, for some reason the American interrogation section was to a certain extent lacking in all these three qualities. It had far more officers than we did and probably more than it needed; those who were not first class were retained in the section, whereas we never kept or accepted officers who were not ~~one hundred percent~~ {100%} useful. Although particular [sic] interrogators made themselves interested in the various technical subjects, no fully qualified technical officer was ever appointed to the section. The American methods were slow in comparison with ours. Their hours of work were circumscribed whereas our interrogators often worked through the night, and their methods were not sufficiently intensive. They ~~often~~ {generally} employed two officers to do an interrogation where we only used one.

This comparative failure of the United States interrogation section was probably largely the result of the different status which it held in the Navy Department in Washington in comparison with ours in the Admiralty. It was kept rigidly separate, its officers were never properly encouraged to consult and visit the users of ~~naval~~ {p/w} Intelligence who themselves often did not appreciate the value of the Intelligence available and certainly never pressed for minute-to-minute and immediate results such as the Admiralty always expected of us. The United States naval ~~interrogations~~ {interrogators} therefore lacked the incentive which Admiralty give to C.S.D.I.C., and consequently took less interest in their work than did the British interrogators. This reflection is not made in a spirit of idle criticism but rather to reinforce the lesson which we learned that naval interrogation can never be ~~available~~ {successful} unless it is closely correlated not only with all other sources of intelligence but also with the day to day work of those responsible for formulating technical and tactical strategy.

When the interrogation centre at Washington came into being towards the end of 1942 a satisfactory working agreement was made between the Admiralty and the Navy Department whereby ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were interrogated in the country in which they were landed irrespective of which navy had been responsible for sinking their vessels.

{Margin Note: I think this is quite unfair ... with field ... D Day ... the Americans make just as ??? forward ??? as British ... of Fort Hunt ... interrogation centre never ... lacked ... & equipment ... presentation of interrogation results – they were better than we were. Churchill.}

c) Canada

The main connection between ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} intelligence in the Admiralty and Canada was through the Canadian censorship; large numbers of ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were held in Canada and an officer was attached by Admiralty to Canadian censorship.⁶ This subject is more fully dealt with in section M below.

It was arranged that prisoners sunk by Canadian {or other} ships or landed in Canada should always be taken to Washington for interrogation; although this may have hurt Canadian pride it would have been a waste of effort, when the interrogation centre was available in Washington, for one to have been set up in Canada, and it would have meant training Canadian officers, who were in any case not available in sufficient numbers. D.N.I. Ottawa was always encouraged to send his officers to help with interrogation in Washington. A building was in fact set apart in Ottawa for naval ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} interrogation; it would have been useful in an emergency but was never needed except for a few specialised interrogations of ~~prisoners sent to~~ {ps/w already in} base camps in Canada.

d) France and Russia

Owing to the collapse of France in 1940 no close liaison was ever established with the French Navy. On only one occasion did a French ship under British control sink a U-boat and take ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w}; one French destroyer in the Channel took prisoners from E-boats on more than one occasion. The results of the interrogation of these ~~prisoners was~~ {ps/w were} available to the French ships in the same way as it was to our own through the British liaison officers on board; the Intelligence available {supplied} to the French was controlled by general policies affecting other sources as well.

No contact was ever made with Russian naval interrogators and their existence could be assumed only from the sight which we had of one interrogation of some U-boat survivors. The supply of Intelligence derived from interrogation was controlled, as it was with the French, by general policies affecting the exchange of all intelligence.

e) Mediterranean and Indian Ocean

In the spring of 1942 a naval interrogator who had been trained at C.S.D.I.C. was seconded for duty with C-in-C Mediterranean and thereafter, with the assistance of certain officers who were trained locally and of a few American officers from Washington, was responsible for all naval interrogation in the Mediterranean and India Ocean. Small C.S.D.I.C.'s were set up in Malta, Cairo, Algiers and Naples to meet operational requirements. Lacking the facilities or {thorough} organisations of the C.S.D.I.C. in England their results were naturally never so complete as those in U.K. C-in-C Mediterranean did obtain the operational information which he required from naval ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} in the Mediterranean but the more general ~~prisoner of war~~ {p/w} intelligence and especially all technical Intelligence was supplied from U.K. ~~Prisoners of war~~ {Ps/w} were frequently brought to England either by air or by one of H.M. Ships after a preliminary interrogation in the Mediterrean [sic] and this was always the case when U-boats were sunk near Gibraltar.

Naval interrogation in the Mediterranean suffered by reason of the length of the lines of communication with ~~the Mediterranean which were prevalent~~ {U.K.} for the greater part of the war. The results of interrogation in U.K. and in the Mediterranean consequently often took a long time to

⁶ Lt Cdr W S Samuel RNVR (SpSS).

reach C-in-C Mediterranean and Admiralty respectively. The most that could be expected of the naval interrogators in the Mediterranean, since they were out of touch with the most recent general information available in Admiralty, was therefore that they should obtain intelligence of local operational importance; in this they succeeded.

The senior naval interrogator {in the Mediterranean} was flown as occasion required to East Africa and Ceylon and, when the war finished in the Mediterranean, was permanently appointed to the East Indies Command. It was nearly always found advisable to fly important prisoners {ps/w} from the Indian Ocean area to U.K. for full interrogation.

L. SECURITY

a) Security of C.S.D.I.C. and Its Methods

The security of C.S.D.I.C. and the methods employed in it were a War Office responsibility. Great care was taken to prevent the location and function of C.S.D.I.C. being known except to those who had a direct interest. Leakages were nevertheless bound to occur and it was generally known in the surroundings of the C.S.D.I.C.'s that they were prisoner-of-war {p/w} interrogation centres. This was possibly the result of loose talk by the workmen responsible for building them {rather} than that of those who worked in them. The microphone system and the production of S.R.'s was always graded Top Secret not so much to conceal the method, which was always suspected, if not generally known, as to conceal the very great success which it had.

b) The Security of Operational Information

It was most important throughout the war {temporarily} to conceal from the Germans ~~for some time~~ the fact that a U-boat had been sunk; it was not generally known whether a U-boat had succeeded in signalling before it sank and it was important to keep the Germans in ignorance as to the fate of a U-boat with which they were no longer in communication; it was moreover always possible from the point of view of the German Admiralty that a U-boat's wireless was out of order. So long as the Germans did not know that a U-boat had been sunk they might continue to rely on its being able to carry out its operational duties and would not necessarily transfer those duties to another vessel. For this reason particular care was taken to ensure that, unless there were reasons for publishing such information immediately, no announcement that prisoners {ps/w} had been taken was made until a sufficient time had elapsed; this time was on an average ~~of~~ about six weeks ~~but~~ {and} was set by those in charge of operational intelligence in N.I.D. After the period decided upon had elapsed names of prisoners {ps/w}, which under the Geneva Convention had to be announced, were released to the Protecting Power, and to the B.B.C. to broadcast for propaganda purposes. Until such time prisoners {ps/w}' correspondence was held up by arrangement with the censorship authorities. The Prisoners of War Information Bureau was generally advised of the existence of prisoners with the request, which was always kept, that the fact of their capture should not be divulged until the set date.

c) Interrogation on Enemy Signal Procedure

In order to preserve the secrecy of our interest in enemy signals a firm rule was maintained that prisoners {ps/w} should never be interrogated on signals procedure or questioned on the signals they had made or received; any particular interrogation designed to obtain the exact text of a signal was forbidden and even when such an exact text was ~~available~~ {volunteered} by prisoners either directly, by S.R. or through S.P.'s, it might not be used without being paraphrased.

d) **The Security of Prisoners-of-War {P/w} Intelligence vis-a-vis Germany**

The only ways in which it was at all likely that information concerning prisoner-of-war {p/w} interrogation {methods} or information {knowledge} which prisoners {ps/w} had themselves obtained while under interrogation might be got back to Germany was either through prisoners' {ps/ws'} correspondence or through a prisoner returning to Germany through repatriation or because he had escaped.

Prisoners' {P/w} mails were very thoroughly censored and we were fortunate enough to discover early on, largely through S.R., a code which was used by U-boat officers in their correspondence. There were therefore very few occasions in which we knew we had missed a message in this code. When such messages were read the letters were if possible forwarded to Germany and only suppressed if the information contained was so important as to make it necessary {to do so} (see section M below). ~~The fact that we had broken and read this code did not become known to the German authorities until sometime in 1943 by which time we had read several hundred messages to and from prisoners and had been able to foil at least two attempts to rescue prisoners from Canada and the United States by U-boat.~~

It was impossible to avoid a certain amount of information concerning the C.S.D.I.C.'s ~~to~~ reach {reaching} Germany through prisoners {ps/w} repatriated under the Geneva Convention for medical reasons. If only in order to obtain reciprocal repatriation for our own prisoners it would have been impossible to prevent the return of such prisoners {ps/w} (see section P). The only safeguard therefore lay in the fact that such knowledge as a prisoner {p/w} might have concerning C.S.D.I.C. would be long out of date by the time a prisoner had been {he was} repatriated.

The danger of prisoners {ps/w} escaping back to Germany {from U.K.} was very small and in no case throughout the war did {any} prisoner succeed in doing so. A few prisoners {ps/w} did, however, escape from Canada and the United States and make their way back through neutral South American countries. One prisoner jumped overboard in the St. Lawrence and returned to Germany. He was a highly intelligent German air force officer who had absorbed a considerable knowledge concerning the C.S.D.I.C.'s from his own experience and from talking to other prisoners {ps/w} and although much of his knowledge was stale he did us considerable harm.⁷

e) **The Release from Prisoner-of-War {P/w} Status**

Although the status of certain prisoners {ps/w} was modified, as mentioned in section N below, for propaganda purposes, only one case is known of the total release of a German prisoner-of-war {p/w} for the purpose of the Admiralty. It is believed that a few others were released at the instance of the other services. The ~~one~~ prisoner {p/w} who was released during the war as a result of Admiralty arrangements was in fact an Army prisoner {p/w}; he was an engineer who had been employed in a variety of projects some of which concerned the navy and as a result of the interest of a naval interrogator taken in him it was found advisable to employ him on naval engineering work; this step was naturally not taken until the most thorough investigation had been made of his interests and background and would not have been considered had he not been a particularly expert and valuable engineer.⁸

⁷ Presumably Franz von Werra: "The One That Got Away"

⁸ The interrogator was most likely Donald Welbourn and the engineer p/w Herbert Cleff.

M. CENSORSHIP

a) In the U.K.

Although early in the war certain difficulties were experienced in making satisfactory arrangements with the censorship authorities, who were jealous of their own prerogatives, N.I.D. eventually obtained authority over the correspondence of all enemy naval prisoners {ps/w}. All officers' mail was scrutinised by an officer in 1/PW in order to discover and read any code messages of the kind {in the code already} referred to in section L above; this code was comparatively simple and consisted in making the initial letters of words represent dots, dashes or breaks in the morse code depending on their position in the alphabet; A-I represented a dot{s}, J-R a dash{es} and the rest of the alphabet a break{s}. The fact that we had broken and read this code did not become known to the German authorities until sometime in 1943 by which time we had read several hundred messages to and from prisoners {ps/w} and had been able to foil at least two attempts to rescue prisoners from Canada and the United States by U-boat. For the first two or three years of the war valuable background information was obtained {in U.K.} from prisoners' letters in the U.K. {p/w correspondence} which was of assistance in interrogating later prisoners {ps/w}.

Close touch was kept with the section of the censorship concerned with the censorship of enemy prisoner-of-war {p/w} mails, which {and it} referred all letters likely to be of interest to N.I.D.

b) Canada

As mentioned in section K above an officer was appointed in {by} N.I.D. for full time liaison duties with Canadian censorship. This arrangement was made necessary by reason of the fact that until 1944 enemy prisoners {no ps/w} were never {ever} retained in U.K. but were always sent for final custody to Canada. There were therefore always a very much larger number of naval prisoners {ps/w} in Canada than in U.K. This officer despite original difficulties, such as we had already had in England, with the civilian censorship authorities was able in the course of time to build up a very thorough intelligence organisation; by supervising and instructing the examiners in all matters of interest to N.I.D., with which he kept in close touch, he was able to supply N.I.D. with a large amount of background information. From {Until} about 1943, when the efficiency of the C.S.D.I.C. had become such that routine background information was no longer necessary, intelligence from Canadian censorship was extremely useful; from 1943 onwards, while N.I.D.'s general requirements declined very considerably, our officer in Ottawa still had a great deal of work to do in checking officers' letters for code and in supplying information for propaganda purposes (see section N).

N. PROPAGANDA

Very close touch was maintained throughout the war between C.S.D.I.C. and N.I.D.17Z, the N.I.D. section responsible for naval propaganda to Germany. This was divided into "white" and "black" propaganda, "white" referring to open propaganda whose origin it was not attempted to conceal, and "black" {to} propaganda which was in theory supposed to emanate from disaffected bodies of German opinion. In both cases the very great majority of the material used, which was in itself immense, was derived from prisoners {ps/w} by one means or another.

White propaganda consisted chiefly of reading names of enemy prisoners over the B.B.C, the European Service of which for part of the war had a special German naval programme, and in {of} talks about the German Navy {in general} and in particular the U-boat Arm {in particular}. These talks

were written by N.I.D.17Z on the basis of information obtained from interrogation. A few leaflets were also produced which were dropped from aircraft and which used naval material.

Black propaganda consisted of subversive broadcasts purporting {to emanate} from secret transmissions {transmitters} in Germany and subversive leaflets which gave the appearance of having been printed clandestinely by disaffected elements there. The black broadcasts were built up from a very small beginning on short waves to an extensive system on medium waves regular transmissions. Both these means of propaganda were controlled by the Foreign Office but contained considerable naval contributions. The great majority of the naval material used in black propaganda was derived from naval prisoners {ps/w}; some prisoners willingly supplied stories, often scandalous, for this purpose with full knowledge of what they were doing; in other cases it was obtained by S.R; a very great deal of information was obtained from censorship, particularly from Canada, and consisted of personal details, such as names, addresses, messages, personal foibles. All this information when put together gave the appearance of being the result of inside knowledge and there is reason to suppose that the German authorities, never realised {realising} how much of it was derived from prisoners {ps/w}, and believed that it was obtained by secret agents.

It was also found convenient to put S.P's who, by reason of long service, were no longer sufficiently up to date, at the disposal of the Foreign Office; they were used {housed} in the Bletchley neighbourhood and worked with the Headquarters of the black propaganda organisation in writing, editing and broadcasting; they retained their prisoner-of-war {p/w} status, but were allowed a considerable amount of freedom.

O. DOCUMENTS

The amount of German naval documents captured before 1944 was extremely small and by reason of 1/PW's {its} expert knowledge of Germany, and German naval Intelligence in particular, this section {1/PW} was made responsible for the interpretation and promulgation of enemy naval documents until the Allied landings in Normandy. The only {Margin Note: No} occasion on which a large amount of documents became available before then was on the capture of U 570 (H.M.S.GRAPH) and a special staff had hurriedly to be got together in order to handle them.

After the Allied landings in North France {Africa} and Italy German naval documents captured there were first scrutinised by officers on C-in-C Mediterranean's staff and subsequently sent to Admiralty for more detailed inspection. It was found that although 1/PW was still the {a} satisfactory channel for the reception and promulgation of documents, since they had not yet reached unmanageable proportions, they could not nevertheless be satisfactorily handled in the long run in 1/PW, and arrangements were made for them to be kept in an inter-service library of enemy documents at Bletchley Park, the naval section of which was N.I.D.12A. In the course of time this division of functions became impossible and shortly before the landings in Normandy, where it was realised {that} large numbers of documents would be captured which could not possibly be handled by 1/PW alone, arrangements were made for all German naval documents to be made the concern of N.I.D. 12A, and 1/PW thereafter ceased to take a direct interest in them, except in so far as it was from time to time called upon to be a channel of communication.

{Margin Note: This isn't really what happened. Churchill}

This development was a logical one and with the growth of prisoner-of-war {p/w} Intelligence it was quite impossible for 1/PW to handle documents with its existing staff. There were

nevertheless certain disadvantages in all enemy naval documents being handled by a body which was not under the full control of D.N.I. and which was administered in some secrecy at a considerable distance from London. It was not until shortly before the end of the war that a special section was set up in N.I.D. in Admiralty (N.I.D. 24) to handle enemy naval documents; vast numbers of documents were captured shortly before and immediately after the surrender of Germany and this section had to be expanded very quickly with personnel who had not been sufficiently trained. This paper is solely concerned with the lessons of ~~prisoner-of-war~~ {p/w} Intelligence but since 1/PW was for so long responsible for the handling of documents it ~~should~~ {may perhaps} be stated that the experience of this war clearly showed that adequate provision should be made sufficiently far ahead for enemy documents to be handled by a special section with specially trained personnel.

P. REPATRIATION

As part of its general duties 1/PW had to keep a close watch on the repatriation under the terms of the Geneva Convention of enemy naval ~~prisoners-of-war~~ {ps/w} and to advise the Naval Staff accordingly. ~~Prisoners~~ {Ps/w} were selected for repatriation by a mixed medical commission which reported directly to the Protecting Power. It was therefore never easy to prevent the repatriation of particular ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w}, but arrangements were made with the War Office for advance information to be obtained of the ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} coming up before the mixed medical commission, and where it was desired to ensure that a particular ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} was not repatriated, it could be arranged for him to miss the commission by being moved to a different camp, by being sent overseas or by some other means. While we were careful not to allow {the repatriation of ps/w} ~~prisoners~~ who were not genuinely sick (Admiral DOENITZ was repatriated in 1918 by feigning madness) we also tried to ensure that no ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} with too great a knowledge of C.S.D.I.C. or its methods was returned; it was particularly undesirable that the identity of our S.P's should be disclosed and we took steps to ensure that ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} who had been mixed with them were not repatriated.

At one stage it appeared that considerable numbers of U-boat officers who, though possibly unfit for sea-going duties, were nevertheless capable of training others, were being repatriated for medical reasons. On being presented with the facts the First Sea Lord ~~instructed~~ {ruled} that no U-boat officers were in any circumstances to be repatriated and these instructions were adhered to until it no longer became a matter of moment to deprive Germany of such personnel.

{Margin Note: 1st Sea Lord or 1st Lord. Latter I think}

{Margin Note: Yes: 1st Lord. Churchill}

Only on one occasion was a serious mistake made in repatriating a German naval officer. The senior officer of an E-boat Flotilla, who, by reason of his political inclination, had been of the greatest use to the naval interrogation section, had remained at C.S.D.I.C. for upwards of three months, and knew all the officer S.P's, was repatriated in December 1944 in exchange for an Allied ~~prisoner~~ {p/w} in the St. Nazaire pocket. All the arrangements for this ~~prisoner~~ {repatriation} were made by the American Army authorities, into whose custody he had been placed for transfer to the United States in order to avoid any possibility of his being able to pass his knowledge back to Germany. The fact that he was going to be repatriated was not referred to the Admiralty and only came to the knowledge of N.I.D. when E-boat ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} were subsequently captured and stated that they had seen him in Germany. It was only by good luck that this officer found it

desirable to remain comparatively silent concerning his experiences in England, {and that} ~~it was in fact only~~ through the intervention of Admiral DOENITZ ~~that~~ he escaped being shot for defeatist talk on his return to Germany.

Q. MERCHANT SEAMEN

It was decided by the War Office to treat enemy merchant seamen as ~~prisoners of war~~ {ps/w} and these arrangements held good throughout the British Empire, except in South Africa where they were treated as civilian internees. Enemy merchant seamen when captured were interrogated by the naval section at C.S.D.I.C. in the same way as captured enemy naval personnel. Generally speaking they were much easier subjects for interrogation than German Service men.

R. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE IN A FUTURE WAR

It is ~~not considered~~ {hoped} that we shall {NOT} be involved in a war with Germany during the active lifetime of any of those with experience of German naval interrogation during the war of 1939-45. Should this, however, occur the services of one or more of these officers will no doubt be offered to D.N.I. at the outbreak of war and continuity thereby be maintained. ~~It is felt that~~ Although a future war ~~must~~ {may} with the advent of the atom bomb take a very different course from the war just concluded, interrogation will always present {the} same basic problems. The War Office will no doubt take the initiative, as it has done before, in view of its established responsibility ~~of~~ {for} the custody of ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} to make the first arrangements and will have the records of C.S.D.I.C. available on which to build. So far as a future naval interrogation section is concerned it can do no better than to scrutinise the remarks in this paper in the light of new circumstances and if thought necessary to resurrect from the vaults bound records of our results of interrogation. Those who were responsible for the interrogation of German naval ~~prisoners~~ {ps/w} in the war of 1939-45 were partly animated by the desire to make a future war impossible and it is hoped that recourse will never be necessary to this paper or to such other records as may be available.