

## MOST SECRET

DDNI(H)<sup>1</sup>  
D.D.N.I.  
D.N.I.

In view of the vital importance of the next six months I hope it will not be considered amiss if I submit one or two recommendations designed to ensure that in the two main operational theatres - the OVERLORD area and the Mediterranean - the best naval intelligence personnel and facilities are available.

2. On returning to the N.I.D. from the Mediterranean it strikes me forcibly that our main talent is not well represented in the two operational headquarters on whom the responsibility for forthcoming operations rests.

3. At A.F.H.Q. Algiers, which will immediately be in the throes of planning for Operation ANVIL and also for certain responsibilities connected with HERCULES, the naval intelligence staff consists of a Commander R.N., of moderate capabilities and no driving power, who has had no intelligence training whatsoever except as a Duty Commander in the O.I.C. He has had no J.I.C. experience and has no knowledge of topographical or static intelligence except what he has gleaned in the chaotic conditions at A.F.H.Q., which have reigned since he became S.O.(I) Mediterranean. To assist him he has two Lieutenants and one Sub-Lieutenant R.N.V.R., who are engaged on watchkeeping duties, and one Wren.

4. So far as COSSAC is concerned, D.N.I. is represented by a Lieut.-Commander R.N.V.R. of ability (backed by an excellent N.I.D. geographical section), but I suggest without the all-round Intelligence background and experience which the post of S.O.(I) to the greatest combined operation in our history would seem to demand. This officer is assisted by one ineffectual Lieutenant R.N.V.R. In the recent early planning phase he has been able to acquit himself excellently, but I suggest that with the appointment of the Supreme Commander, and as D Day draws nearer, there will be heavy miscellaneous duties in connection with OVERLORD with which he has neither the seniority nor the experience to deal.

5. There is a tendency to regard OVERLORD as purely a military operation. The papers I have seen on occupational and other problems dismiss naval responsibilities very briefly, but I fancy that the D.N.I. will be called upon to concern himself with such COSSAC duties as the following:-

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<sup>1</sup> This copy was for DDNI(H), Captain H Clanchy (Retd), who was responsible for engineering and technical matters, Naval Section Washington, Information Section, Geographical Handbooks and internal security.

- i. Destruction of U-boat shelters in France and Norway. } Already raised and at present being dealt with by D.D.O.D.(I) and me.
- ii. Employment of 30 Commando )
- iii. Intelligence from occupied ports )
- iv. Surveying of German waters for post-hostilities purposes. )
- v. Provision of intelligence and security officers for ports in France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Norway and Denmark. <sup>2</sup>
- vi. Naval Intelligence required from Germany after defeat, e.g. Radar, infra-red, and other technical matters. <sup>3</sup>
- vii. Indictment and apprehension of enemy naval war criminals.
- viii. Preventing the German Navy from sequestering (as in the last war) their naval secrets after defeat.
- ix. Miscellaneous, naval intelligence problems arising after the defeat of Germany.

6. All these wide problems will undoubtedly be laid at the door of the D.N.I., probably, as with Italy, very much at the last minute, and would seem to require some very lively forward thinking on the part of D.N.I.'s representatives with COSSAC so that the necessary plans can be made.

7. Outside these two main operational headquarters, naval intelligence is represented by large and excellent staffs both in the Admiralty and even at such comparatively quiescent centres as Gibraltar and Alexandria. Even minor intelligence centres in South America such as Rio have staffs of 15 or 20.

8. Without wishing to paint an exaggerated picture, and without labouring comparisons which are clearly fallacious, it does seem that, at any rate for the next six months, the best possible N.I.D. officers with completely adequate staffs should be available to COSSAC and A.F.H.Q., and that sacrifices in the N.I.D. could well be accepted if by so doing the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL can be increased.

9- It can be argued that since neither C.-in-C. Mediterranean, nor Admiral Creasy has complained about the Inadequacy of their Naval Intelligence staffs, the position is satisfactory. Personally, I believe their failure to comment is due to lack of interest in intelligence, and the usual lack of knowledge of the activities and resources of the N.I.D.

10. As an immediate step I would submit that D.N.I. or D.D.N.I. should visit the Mediterranean forthwith in order to set in train the movement of additional staff from Alexandria and Gibraltar to A.F.H.Q., and to discuss the position of C.O.I.S. with C.-in-C. Mediterranean who, it is known, is anxious for a change. In the event of a suitable relief not

<sup>2</sup> Hand annotated: "COSSAC dealing with."

<sup>3</sup> Hand annotated: "Paper started [?] on this?"

being available, and in order to avoid the promotion problem, it is suggested that a Deputy C.O.I.S. Western Mediterranean, and a Deputy C.O.I.S. Eastern Mediterranean should be appointed forthwith, allowing the post of C.O.I.S. to lapse for the time being.

11. So far as COSSAC is concerned, it is suggested that Commander Tower should be appointed S.O.(I), and be allowed to choose such staff as he requires. Payr. Cdr. Denning might be a suitable Head for the German Section. These moves might well be accompanied by a reorganisation of Section 1, involving its reduction to a straight-forward German Section, by the removal of 1L. and 1E. to form a combined COSSAC Section in the N.I.D.

12. Points which might require immediate examination are:

- (a) The I.S.T.D. programme for COSSAC and general priorities as a result of SEXTANT.<sup>4</sup>
- (b) The link-up of 17Z with COSSAC requirements, as has been done by similar sections in the War Office and Air Ministry.<sup>5</sup>
- (c) The issue of new priorities to the Contact Register, and Photographic Library.<sup>6</sup>
- (d) The link between ACOS, Scottish Command, COSSAC and N.I.D., and the problems connected with ATLANTIS.
- (e) S.O.(I) to C.-in-C. Rosyth (Naval Force Commander for ATLANTIS) is a Cdr. Haes, R.N., appointed two months ago, without intelligence experience, and with only a few days' training in N.I.D.<sup>7</sup>
- (f) S.O.(I) to ACOS, who would have been a great standby for ATLANTIS, is due for relief.
- (g) Lt.Cdr. Gonin's No. 1 is a U.S. Naval Officer, Lieut. Prinz. If Gonin went sick he would be the Senior and most capable section officer in 1L!<sup>8</sup>

13. Finally, my excuse for raising all these hares is the following quotation from SEXTANT: "Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD are the supreme operations for 1944, and nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations."

(signed) I L Fleming  
N.I.D. 17F.  
27.12.43

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<sup>4</sup> Hand annotated: "Planners & JIF"

<sup>5</sup> Hand annotated: "You have this in hand?"

<sup>6</sup> Hand annotated: "Topo: Subj: etc[?]"

<sup>7</sup> Hand annotated: "In spite of this I have every confidence in him."

<sup>8</sup> Hand annotated: "Bond is back."

## MOST SECRET

There is considerable misapprehension about the build up of COS SAC, and we are not the only people In the Admiralty who have difficulties in painting a clear picture of COSSAC's activities and responsibilities.

2. The real trouble is that OVERLORD and RANKIN are both being built up and will be launched from the Home Front, as opposed to TORCH, which could not be entirely controlled and centralised in the U.K.
3. Although COSSAC is a very large concern with great responsibilities, it is highly decentralised, and obtains all it requires by enquiry from the various Ministries and organisations in London. It is apparent, therefore, that there is no need for a vast Intelligence organisation inside COSSAC itself, since requirements under the heading of Intelligence can be met by the J.I.C. and the Service Ministries. For example, if COSSAC want to weigh up the possibility of an attack by midget submarines on OVERLORD, then all it has to do is to request the J.I.C. to prepare an appreciation on this subject. It is perhaps therefore misleading to infer that D.N.I. is only represented in COSSAC by a Lieut. Commander R.N.V.R. and a Lieutenant R.N.V.R. Actually, COSSAC can, I am sure, make direct application to N. I.D. on any question of Intelligence, but the move should come from COSSAC in the first place, and not from the Admiralty.
4. The organisation of RANKIN (Sea) is very much decentralised by COSSAC onto all the various naval Cs. in C. involved, who each have their normal S.O.(I) and Staff. In this connection it has already been laid down that COSSAC should deal direct with C.-in-C. Rosyth for any questions affecting the Scottish Command, and this therefore precludes ACOS dealing in any matters affecting RANKIN and OVERLORD.
5. Reference para. 5 of Cdr. Fleming's paper, the following answers are supplied to the sub-headings of this paragraph :-
  - (iv) It is not understood what is involved in the surveying of German waters for post hostilities purposes. Surely the major part of this problem will be solved by action on the part of the Armistice Commission, who will request all detailed information, with plans of coasts and waters, of the enemy coast.
  - (v) This question requires action, and very much affects the N. I.D., but I understand that COSSAC will raise this point and ask for the necessary appointments to be made.
  - (vi) ) Although these are all questions for which D.N.I. is, in the first place,
  - (vii) ) responsible, they seem to be outside the scope of the Intelligence officers of an
  - (viii) ) Expeditionary Force. On the other hand, they must be catered for and would
  - (ix) ) seem to fall into one of the many bodies that will be set up by the Armistice Commission, and given a roving commission with full powers to obtain the information they require.  
This problem should be studied as something apart from OVERLORD and

RANKIN.

5. With reference to paragraph 12 of Commander Fleming's paper:

(a) The I.S.T.D. programmes for COSSAC and SEXTANT are dealt with by the Topographical Sub-Committee, and do not seem to be a subject for which D.N.I. is personally responsible.

(b) I am not altogether clear as to what is required on this point. Surely the whole of P.E.W. as one body will have some common directive on COSSAC requirements, should any be made. It would be interesting to know what exactly the War Office and Air Ministry corresponding Sections have done in this connection.

(c) This again is the responsibility of the J.I.C. and Topographical Sub-Committee.

(d) The question of ACOS does not arise, as has already been explained.

(e) The whole question of the calibre of the S.O.(I) to the Cs.-in-C. may require examination. In this connection I think what is wanted is some comparatively senior officer, if possible with staff and Intelligence experience, to run round all the various Cs. in C. concerned and see if the S.Os.(I) are getting on with their various problems.

6. To sum up, it is quite impossible for D.N.I. to make any direct suggestions to Admiral Creasy or Admiral Ramsay that some officer of Commander's or Captain's rank should now be appointed as S.O.(I) to A.N.C.X.F., since we have no evidence that we can show to substantiate our demand for what virtually is the supersession of Richardson. On the other hand, it would no doubt be useful anyhow, for a short period, to have an officer of Commander's or Captain's rank, with staff and Intelligence experience, to be lent to COSSAC with the object of vetting all the various intelligence staffs, and to help the Americans in the COSSAC set-up to solve any Intelligence problems.

7. On the other hand, Admiral Creasy can quite well reply that no such officer is needed since the D.N.I. has already contracted to supply on demand all intelligence that is required, and that his Intelligence requirements at the various ports are already decentralised in the respective Cs.-in-C.

8- Finally, in order to clear our own mind it might be useful to send an officer from N.I.D., preferably Cdr. Fleming, to visit all the S.Os.(I) of the various Cs.-in-C., and see what further action is required to ensure that the Intelligence side is functioning at its best.

(signed) H Clanchy

D.D.N.I.(H)

28.12.43

## Glossary and Abbreviations

A.F.H.Q.	Armed Forces Headquarters.
A.N.C.X.F	Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force.
ANVIL	Code name for the Allied landings in southern France.
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
COSSAC	Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander – the planning committee for D-Day.
D.D.N.I.	Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
D.N.I.	Director of Naval Intelligence.
I.S.T.D.	Inter-Service Training Depot [?].
J.I.C.	Joint Intelligence Committee.
N.I.D.	Naval Intelligence Division.
OVERLORD	Code name for D-Day
RANKIN	Code name for contingency plans to bring the European war to a rapid end in the event of a sudden weakening or collapse of German resistance.
R.N.V.R.	Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.
SEXTANT	Code name for the Cairo Conferences (22-26 November and 3-7 December 1943)
S.O.(I)	Staff Officer (Intelligence).